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RAISING THE STAKES FOR NEW TOWNS: 
STATE TOOLS TO CURB EXCLUSIONARY 
MUNICIPAL INCORPORATION 
Abstract: The establishment of a new city or town affects all the communities 
around it. Before incorporation, an unincorporated territory typically pays taxes 
into its county government and receives county public services, such as participa-
tion in the county’s public schools. When an area incorporates, the new city or 
town effectively opts out of county services and taxes. Instead, the new munici-
pality collects its own property taxes to fund its own public services. As a result, 
the surrounding county loses part of its tax base. Recently, a trend has emerged in 
local government law whereby majority wealthy and white unincorporated en-
claves, particularly in the southern United States, have incorporated and often 
broken away from regional school districts. These exclusionary incorporations 
have created negative externalities for their counties because they have segregat-
ed schools, increased income inequality, reduced county revenue, and limited re-
sources for public services. States have broad constitutional authority to shape 
their municipal incorporation regimes. Some states have embraced this authority 
and created mechanisms to curtail exclusionary incorporation. Their statutes have 
created blueprints for others to follow. This Note argues that states should require 
communities seeking incorporation to demonstrate regional consent and should 
empower state-level or county-level government entities to review incorporation 
petitions with regional needs in mind. 
INTRODUCTION 
East Baton Rouge Parish1 sits to the east of the Mississippi River.2 Until 
1956, Louisiana permitted racial segregation in the East Baton Rouge Parish 
Public Schools.3 Then, in 1954, in Brown v. Board of Education, the U.S. Su-
preme Court outlawed de jure segregation in schools across the United States.4 
                                                                                                                           
 1 What other states refer to as “counties,” Louisiana refers to as “parishes.” See Jeffrey D. McMil-
len, Note, The Effects of the Voting Rights Act: A Case Study, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 725, 725 n.5 (1994) 
(exploring Voting Rights Act litigation and subsequent voting data in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana as a 
case study of the Act’s ability to increase voter registration among people of color). 
 2 See Rick Rojas, Suburbanites in Louisiana Vote to Create a New City of Their Own, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/13/us/baton-rouge-st-george.html [https://
perma.cc/D9PW-FSB5] (providing a map of the Mississippi River and East Baton Rouge Parish). 
 3 See Jessica E. Watson, Quest for Unitary Status: The East Baton Rouge Parish School Desegre-
gation Case, 62 LA. L. REV. 953, 954 (2002) (arguing that the U.S. District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of Louisiana should terminate its judicial control over the East Baton Rouge Parish School Sys-
tem after forty-five years of desegregation efforts). 
 4 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). Private individuals’ actions create de facto segregation. Jonathan 
Fischbach et al., Race at the Pivot Point: The Future of Race-Based Policies to Remedy De Jure Seg-
regation After Parents Involved in Community Schools, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 491, 496 (2008). 
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A year later, a group of parents of color banded together to sue the East Baton 
Rouge Parish School Board, demanding school integration.5 After decades of 
litigation, court orders, and desegregation plans, parties reached an agreement 
on June 18, 2003.6 
In 2012, a group of predominantly white, wealthy parents living in the St. 
George neighborhood of East Baton Rouge Parish launched their own move-
ment.7 The group petitioned the Louisiana State Legislature to let it detach 
from the East Baton Rouge Parish School System and create its own school 
district.8 After failing twice, it changed course in 2013 to incorporate its own 
municipality instead.9 Incorporation is the legal process for creating a munici-
                                                                                                                           
Government laws and policies cause de jure segregation. Id. In Brown, the Supreme Court held that 
“[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal” and that de jure segregated schools violated 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 347 U.S. at 495; see U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”); infra note 122 and accompanying text (explaining the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 5 Watson, supra note 3, at 954; East Baton Rouge Parish’s Desegregation Case, THE ADVOCATE 
(June 19, 2003), https://www.ebrpl.com/oaal/documents/desegchronology.pdf [https://web.archive.
org/web/20181006031515/https://www.ebrpl.com/oaal/documents/desegchronology.pdf]. 
 6 East Baton Rouge Parish’s Desegregation Case, supra note 5. East Baton Rouge Parish Public 
Schools had the longest standing desegregation order in the country. Adam Harris, The New Secession, 
THE ATLANTIC (May 20, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2019/05/resegregation-
baton-rouge-public-schools/589381/ [https://perma.cc/3WN5-664D]. 
 7 Harris, supra note 6. East Baton Rouge Parish was 75% African American when the court end-
ed the desegregation order. Id. Seven years later, the parish was 81% African American and 89% 
people of color. Id. 
 8 Id. Dr. Belinda Davis, a professor at Louisiana State University and president of the One Com-
munity, One School District, an organization campaigning against the St. George school breakaway, 
later explained: 
I remember being surprised to hear [proponents of the school district breakaway] wax 
nostalgic about the days when they were in school in Baton Rouge and how it was just 
a really great education system. I had to bring up the fact that when they were in school, 
we were a segregated school district. While Baton Rouge might have been great for 
White kids, it probably wasn’t so great for the Black children in our schools. They kind 
of brushed that off . . . . 
Gabriella Runnels, Breaking Apart: Confronting Race in East Baton Rouge Parish, 1 WOMEN LEAD-
ING CHANGE: CASE STUD. ON WOMEN, GENDER, & FEMINISM 59, 63 (2016) (citation omitted). 
 9 Harris, supra note 6. Municipal incorporation is the process of forming a municipal corporation, 
commonly known as a city or town. 1 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 
305 (3d ed. 2010). Specifically, a municipal corporation is: 
[A] body politic and corporate, possessing a legal entity and name, a seal by which to 
act in solemn form, a capacity to contract and be contracted with, to sue and be sued, a 
persona standi in judicio, to hold and dispose of property, and thereby to acquire rights 
and incur liabilities, with power of perpetual succession, inhabitants and territory. 
Id. at 177–78. By creating their own municipality, the families could separate their property tax base 
from the rest of the parish. Harris, supra note 6. Their property taxes would not be pooled into East 
Baton Rouge Parish for redistribution to all schools. Id. Instead, their taxes would only go to St. 
George schools. Id. 
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pality—a city or town—where one did not previously exist.10 Before incorpo-
rating, St. George was part of an unincorporated territory outside the City of 
Baton Rouge.11 Typically, county government is the only form of government 
for unincorporated territory.12 East Baton Rouge Parish and the City of Baton 
Rouge, however, have one consolidated government.13 Even though St. George 
is not part of the City of Baton Rouge, it shares a school system with it.14 By 
2019, St. George became the third community within East Baton Rouge Parish 
to vote to incorporate and detach.15 By permitting St. George to incorporate, 
the state of Louisiana will effectively ensure school resegregation.16 
The incorporation of St. George epitomizes a trend in the American South 
toward school district secession unraveling decades of integration efforts.17 
School district secessions are part of an even broader story of municipal exclu-
sionary incorporations entrenching and aggravating income and racial dispari-
                                                                                                                           
 10 MCQUILLIN, supra note 9, at 304–05. 
 11 Runnels, supra note 8, at 59; see Rojas, supra note 2 (providing a map that shows that St. 
George is adjacent to the City of Baton Rouge). 
 12 Darryl T. Cohen, Population Distribution Inside and Outside Incorporated Places: 2000, at 2 
(U.S. Census Bureau, Working Paper No. 82, 2007). Incorporated areas have “legally defined munici-
pal boundaries.” Id. In contrast, “[i]n unincorporated areas, [public] services are typically provided by 
either the county or minor civil division government, or sometimes by a nearby incorporated place.” 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 13 Our Government, CITY OF BATON ROUGE & PARISH OF E. BATON ROUGE, https://www.brla.
gov/1062/Our-Government [https://perma.cc/LQ6W-7VHG]. The East Baton Rouge Parish and City 
of Baton Rouge consolidated in 1947. Id. A consolidated government increases government efficiency 
and reduces costs by eliminating duplication of public services. Id. 
 14 Harris, supra note 6. 
 15 Id. 
 16 See id. (explaining the process by which St. George is seeking to incorporate under Louisiana 
law). East Baton Rouge Parish has approximately 46.5% people of color, whereas St. George has 
approximately 15% people of color. Id. After incorporating their own city, residents of St. George 
would have to pass a constitutional amendment to receive funding for a new school district. Runnels, 
supra note 8, at 65. Residents of Central, Louisiana were able to incorporate a new city in 2005 and 
then receive legislative approval to create their own school district in 2007. Harris, supra note 6. If St. 
George also creates its own school district, it will “build a wall,” blocking off school funding redistri-
bution. Runnels, supra note 8, at 64, 66. The St. George residents will take their property tax dollars 
with them for their new municipality, depleting the East Baton Rouge city-parish budget by nearly 
30%. Id. at 66. 
 17 Erika K. Wilson, The New School Segregation, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 139, 209, 210 (2016); 
see Harris, supra note 6 (“A pattern has emerged over the past two decades: White, wealthy communi-
ties have been separating from their city’s school districts to form their own. According to a recent 
report from EdBuild, a nonprofit focused on public-school funding, 73 communities have split to form 
their own school districts since 2000, and the rate of places doing so has rapidly accelerated [between 
2017 and 2019].”). School district secessions in Gardendale, Alabama and Trussville, Alabama each 
increased county-wide racial segregation in 2014 and 2005, respectively. Wilson, supra, at 167. Both 
Gardendale and Trussville are mostly white areas within racially diverse counties. Id. At least ten 
southern suburban communities seceded or tried to secede from more racially diverse county-wide 
school districts between 2011 and 2016. Id. at 142. 
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ties in states that have unincorporated territories.18 Wealthy communities in 
unincorporated territories in the Southeast have realized that their state laws 
make it very easy to establish new towns.19 These formerly unincorporated 
areas can keep their property taxes within their municipal boundaries and can 
prevent county fiscal redistribution of their resources.20 When wealthy com-
munities wall off their resources, their neighboring communities are left with 
shrinking tax bases, reduced government services, and underfunded schools.21 
This pattern of exclusionary incorporation is not inevitable.22 States have 
tools at their disposal and the constitutional authority to structure their incorpo-
ration laws to prevent exclusionary incorporation.23 This Note explores the 
variety of ways in which states can structure their municipal incorporation 
laws to prevent exclusionary incorporation.24 Part I provides an overview of 
the municipal life cycle in the United States and describes common compo-
nents of municipal incorporation statutes.25 Part II compares and contrasts state 
incorporation mechanisms through three state case studies.26 Part III assesses 
the externalities of municipal incorporation, state tools for minimizing these 
externalities, and the benefits of state incorporation laws that authorize state 
oversight entities and require regional consent to incorporation.27 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See Christopher J. Tyson, Municipal Identity as Property, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 647, 648, 661, 
669 (2014) (exploring the causes of the “perceived property right in municipal identity”). 
 19 See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 33:1–3 (2020) (permitting incorporation if it is reasonable and if a 
majority of the residents of the proposed municipality vote in favor of it); Harris, supra note 6 (detail-
ing how residents of an unincorporated part of East Baton Rouge Parish, St. George, forced a vote to 
incorporate after collecting signatures of only residents of the proposed city). Three Louisiana com-
munities have incorporated in recent years. Runnels, supra note 8, at 65. 
 20 See infra notes 288–296 and accompanying text (explaining how exclusionary incorporation 
affects neighboring communities by insulating taxes from county redistribution). 
 21 See infra notes 288–296 and accompanying text (describing the effects of exclusionary incor-
poration on regional public services). Local property taxes provide the primary funding for public 
schools in the United States. Harris, supra note 6. 
 22 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-101.01 (2020) (reflecting a policy against the incorporation of 
communities within urbanized areas); Green v. City of Tucson, 340 F.3d 891, 903 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(explaining that the Arizona municipal incorporation statute purposefully protects existing cities and 
towns from municipal fragmentation). 
 23 See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (holding that municipalities are 
“creatures” of their respective states and that states have the authority to govern incorporation law); 
infra notes 202–282 and accompanying text (describing the ways in which California and Arizona 
prevent exclusionary incorporation). 
 24 See infra notes 28–332 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 28–149 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 150–282 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 283–332 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE LIFE AND STRUCTURE OF AN AMERICAN MUNICIPALITY 
Few things are more quintessentially American than local self-govern-
ment.28 In fact, twenty American cities predate the existence of the United 
States of America.29 Each state has local governments, and in many ways local 
governments affect people’s everyday lives more intimately than either state or 
federal government.30 Depending on the state, local governments can have the 
power to educate youth, maintain police forces, put out fires, remove waste, 
and control methods of transportation.31 Yet almost 250 years after the found-
ing of the United States, cities and towns are still in flux.32 In any given year, 
Americans create new municipalities, merge municipalities together, change 
their municipal borders, or even dissolve their cities.33 
Constitutionally, states have broad discretion in how they design their mu-
nicipal incorporation processes.34 To create and maintain a state municipal in-
corporation regime, states must answer challenging policy questions throughout 
the process.35 This Part describes the municipality’s role in the landscape of 
American governance and the anatomy of a municipal incorporation statute.36 
                                                                                                                           
 28 See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1990) (“Localism as a value is deeply embedded in the American legal and 
political culture.”); see also MCQUILLIN, supra note 9, at 56–57 (“Since our country was conceived 
on the theory of local self-government, it follows naturally that our nation is made up of a collection 
of subordinate but nearly independent self-governing communities, welded together by common inter-
ests and purposes and united into a great commonwealth.”). 
 29 MCQUILLIN, supra note 9, at 11 n.1. The British crown granted twenty-four local government 
charters, and the state legislatures subsequently confirmed many of them after the American Revolu-
tion. Id. at 11 & n.1 (citing Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 
(1980)). 
 30 See WILLIAM D. VALENTE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERN-
MENT LAW 6–7 (5th ed. 2001) (describing the abundance of local governments in the United States, 
and explaining that local governments deliver important services to the population, including but not 
limited to “education, policing, fire prevention, street and road maintenance, mass transit, and sewage 
and solid waste removal”). 
 31 Id. The city of Phoenix, Arizona “generates 70% of Arizona’s total output and 71% of the 
state’s employment.” Hannah J. Wiseman, Rethinking Municipal Corporate Rights, 61 B.C. L. REV. 
591, 635 (2020) (quoting RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER: URBAN GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL 
AGE 28–29 (2016)). 
 32 See VALENTE ET AL., supra note 30, at 6, 9 (expressing that local governments are often in 
flux). 
 33 See RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LO-
CAL GOVERNMENT LAW 206 (8th ed. 2016) (detailing the frequency of municipality creation and 
boundary changes between 1952 and 2012). 
 34 Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907); see infra note 109 and accompanying 
text (detailing the facts and holding of Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh). 
 35 See infra notes 68–72 and accompanying text (describing the fundamental questions every state 
must answer regarding who can incorporate what land, under what conditions, and how they may go 
about doing so). 
 36 See infra notes 40–149 and accompanying text. 
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Section A of this Part defines the municipality as a governing entity.37 Section 
B describes the municipal life cycle.38 Section C identifies common compo-
nents of municipal incorporation statutes.39 
A. Local Government in America 
Even though cities and towns represent the quintessential form of local 
government in America, they are not the only kinds of local government.40 
Some are general-purpose governments, exercising authority over many do-
mains, such as public safety, schools, land use, and transportation, whereas 
others are special-purpose governments, confined to one function or limited 
functions.41 Even within the category of general-purpose governments, the 
terminology varies by state; some states have counties, cities, and towns, but 
others call their entities townships, villages, boroughs, districts, and municipal 
incorporations.42 Notwithstanding this diversity, states tend to agree on the 
city-town distinction, labeling their more urbanized, populous areas as cities 
and their more rural or suburban lower-population areas as towns.43 At one end 
of the spectrum, the town of Warm River, Idaho is home to three residents.44 At 
the other end, New York City had a population of 8,175,133 as of the 2010 
U.S. Census.45 Because of their municipalities’ lower populations, residents of 
                                                                                                                           
 37 See infra notes 40–51 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 52–67 and accompanying text. 
 39 See infra notes 68–149 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra notes 41–51 and accompanying text (describing the variety of local governments in 
the United States). 
 41 VALENTE ET AL., supra note 30, at 11. Special district governments have “very narrowly de-
fined authority and are authorized to undertake only one or a very limited number of functions.” Id. 
An example is the school district. Id. The special district government is “the most rapidly growing 
form of local government in the United States.” Id. The number of special district governments tripled 
in the second half of the twentieth century, jumping from 12,340 in 1952 to 34,683 in 1997. Id. (citing 
1 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., 1997 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS: GOVERNMENT OR-
GANIZATION 6 (1999)).  
 42 MCQUILLIN, supra note 9, at 44, 48–49; VALENTE ET AL., supra note 30, at 6, 9, 10. Despite 
the variety across states, there are patterns of terminology that make the U.S. Census possible. See 
VALENTE ET AL., supra note 30, at 10 (explaining that towns and townships are more common in 
certain states). For example, the New England states, New York, and Wisconsin have “towns,” 
whereas the other Middle Atlantic and Midwestern states have “townships.” Id. Midwest townships 
perform more limited functions in comparison to their New England and Middle Atlantic town coun-
terparts. Id. Cities are typically dense, urban areas with high populations. Id. at 9. Traditionally, in 
rural states, the county provides sufficient governmental services to the rural areas, while the cities 
within the state have their own government for additional services beyond what the county can pro-
vide. Id. These services include “police, fire, sanitation, traffic control, public health, water, sewage 
disposal, land use, [and] social services.” Id. 
 43 MCQUILLIN, supra note 9, at 42–43; VALENTE ET AL., supra note 30, at 9. 
 44 Warm River, Idaho Population 2021, WORLD POPULATION REV., https://worldpopulationreview.
com/us-cities/warm-river-id-population [https://perma.cc/E9V4-N66F]. 
 45 The 30 Most Populous Cities, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, https://www.nlc.org/the-30-most-
populous-cities [https://web.archive.org/web/20200315191245/https://www.nlc.org/the-30-most-
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towns usually participate more directly in the government than residents of 
cities, who typically delegate the decision-making power to representatives.46 
The authority of municipalities varies too, often depending on the scope 
of county power.47 In some states, such as Connecticut and Rhode Island, 
counties are merely geographic units.48 In other states, counties play important 
service-providing and policy roles, rendering local government services less 
necessary.49 Municipal governance structures vary as well, with some having 
mayors and city councils and others having select boards or town meetings, or 
both.50 Regardless of their scope of power in relation to the county govern-
ment, most municipalities have two important powers: the power to tax proper-
ty and the power to zone.51 
                                                                                                                           
populous-cities]. The second most populous city was Los Angeles, California, with 3,792,621 resi-
dents in 2010. Id. The third most populous was Chicago, Illinois, with 2,695,598 residents in 2010. Id. 
 46 MCQUILLIN, supra note 9, at 43. The differences between a town and a city are comparable to 
the differences between a democracy and a republic. See id. (“The marked and characteristic distinc-
tion between a town organization and that of a city is that in the former all the qualified inhabitants 
meet, deliberate, act and vote in their natural and personal capacities in the exercise of their corporate 
powers; whereas, under a city government, this is done by representatives.” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Warren v. City of Charlestown, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 84, 101 (1854))). 
 47 See VALENTE ET AL., supra note 30, at 7–8 (describing the diversity of county authority across 
the states). The county structure and borders rarely change in most states. Id. at 8. The United States 
inherited the county structure from England. Id. at 7. In England, the shire—the equivalent of a coun-
ty—historically conducted prosecutions, maintained public records such as deeds and birth and death 
certificates, assessed property value, maintained public roads, registered voters, and provided social 
services, such as health care. Id. 
 48 Id. at 7. 
 49 See id. at 8 (explaining that strong county governments provide “housing, mass transit, airports, 
parks and recreation, water supply and sewage, planning, zoning and regional governance”). 
 50 See, e.g., Robert W. Ritchie et al., Forms of Municipal Government and Methods of Govern-
ance, in MASSACHUSETTS MUNICIPAL LAW ch. 2 (2d ed. 2015) (describing municipal government 
diversity in Massachusetts). 
 51 Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. 
L. REV. 1115, 1134 (1996); see ELI MOORE ET AL., HAAS INST., ROOTS, RACE, & PLACE: A HISTORY 
OF RACIALLY EXCLUSIONARY HOUSING IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA 57–58 (2019), https://
escholarship.org/uc/item/2j08r197 [https://perma.cc/7BBU-4GQB] (describing how Fremont, Califor-
nia used zoning to attract businesses and raise tax revenue); infra note 82 and accompanying text 
(explaining that municipal zoning can shape a town or city’s demographics). Up until the Supreme 
Court deemed them unconstitutional in the 1948 decision in Shelley v. Kraemer, white residents 
would use racially restrictive covenants to exclude African Americans from certain cities and towns. 
NANCY BURNS, THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: PRIVATE VALUES IN PUBLIC 
INSTITUTIONS 55–56, 56 n.73 (1994) (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)). Racially restric-
tive covenants are “subdivision rules or neighborhood agreements that ‘run with the land’ to bar sales 
of rentals by minority members.” Carol M. Rose, Racially Restrictive Covenants—Were They Dignity 
Takings?, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 939, 939 (2016). Thereafter, white residents of cities and towns 
turned to their municipal zoning power to exclude African Americans based on poverty. BURNS, su-
pra, at 56. Zoning power is relevant to municipal incorporation because once residents incorporate, 
they can zone other people out based on character, value, and density of housing. See MOORE ET AL., 
supra, at 57–58 (explaining how white residents of Fremont, California used zoning to exclude resi-
dents of color). For example, the East Bay of California experienced significant racial stratification 
during “white flight” in the 1950s and 1960s. Id. at 58. Residents of what is now Fremont, California 
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B. The Municipal Life Cycle 
Notwithstanding their importance in American life, local governments, 
unlike the states and counties under which they exist, are far from permanent 
or fixed.52 Whereas the most recent states to join the United States were Alaska 
and Hawaii in 1959, nine municipalities have incorporated in 2011 alone.53 
Between 2000 and 2010, the United States witnessed a new municipality for-
mation every twenty-four days.54 Between 1952 and 1997, the number of mu-
nicipal corporations in the United States increased fifteen percent, from 16,807 
to 19,372.55 By 2007, the number of municipal corporations rose to 19,492, not 
including the 16,519 new township governments, 50,432 special-purpose local 
governments, and 3,033 county governments.56 
                                                                                                                           
incorporated and then zoned a substantial amount of property for industrial development to attract 
capital from the nearby cities—Oakland and Richmond. Id. at 57. People of color were unable to follow 
white residents to these new communities due to exclusionary zoning focused on narrow housing types, 
which in turn led to racial stratification. Id. at 58. The white population of Richmond, California de-
creased from 85,316 in 1950 to 56,066 in 1960 and further down to 47,368 by 1970. Id.; City of Rich-
mond: Contra Costa County, BAY AREA CENSUS, http://www.bayareacensus.ca.gov/cities/Richmond.
htm [https://perma.cc/U9ZW-5L95]. Similarly, the population in Oakland changed from 86% white in 
1950 to 73.6% white in 1960 and then to 59.1% white in 1970. City of Oakland: Alameda County, 
BAY AREA CENSUS, http://www.bayareacensus.ca.gov/cities/Oakland.htm [https://perma.cc/E3HA-
6VHD]. Meanwhile, nearby Fremont was 98.3% white in 1960, which was the year of its first census 
as a municipality. City of Fremont: Alameda County, BAY AREA CENSUS, http://www.bayareacensus.
ca.gov/cities/Fremont60.htm [https://perma.cc/PG9F-7F6K]. Incorporation policy not only affects 
who can move into a new municipality, but also who can incorporate a municipality in the first place. 
See Sarah Ihn, The Long Road to Self-Determination: A Critique of Municipal Incorporation Through 
the East Los Angeles Cityhood Movement, 13 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 67, 86 (2010) (describing how 
incorporation has negatively impacted low-income communities in East Los Angeles, California). The 
California incorporation statute “favor[s] high revenue communities” and notes that the incorporation 
process “is highly resource-intensive in time and money—two particularly scarce commodities in low-
income communities.” Id. 
 52 BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 33, at 206; see VALENTE ET AL., supra note 30, at 9 (stat-
ing that local governments are frequently in flux). 
 53 Gary Lawson & Robert D. Sloane, The Constitutionality of Decolonization by Associated 
Statehood: Puerto Rico’s Legal Status Reconsidered, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1123, 1142 (2009); Kathryn T. 
Rice et al., Why New Cities Form: An Examination into Municipal Incorporation in the United States 
1950–2010, 29 J. PLAN. LITERATURE 140, 144 (2013); see Sarah Mervosh, They Wanted to Save Their 
119-Year-Old Village. So They Got Rid of It., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/11/26/us/amelia-ohio-dissolve.html [https://perma.cc/B9V5-R8CW] (covering the dissolu-
tion of Amelia, Ohio); Rojas, supra note 2 (highlighting the incorporation referendum creating the 
new city of St. George in Louisiana). In 2011, there were also 1,697 annexations. Rice et al., supra, at 
144. 
 54 Rice et al., supra note 53, at 140. 
 55 VALENTE ET AL., supra note 30, at 9. The number of municipalities in the United States in-
creased by about 16% between 1952 and 2012. BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 33, at 206. 
 56 Number of Municipal Governments & Population Distribution, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, 
https://www.nlc.org/number-of-municipal-governments-population-distribution [https://web.archive.
org/web/20200619192129/https://www.nlc.org/number-of-municipal-governments-population-dis-
tribution]. Out of the 50,432 special-purpose local governments, there were “37,381 special districts, 
13,726 independent school districts, and 1,452 dependent public school systems.” Id. 
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In addition to incorporating, municipalities occasionally increase their ter-
ritory and population by annexing unincorporated land.57 A municipality typi-
cally cannot annex territory within the boundaries of another municipality, but 
it can annex unincorporated territory within a county.58 Sometimes, residents 
of unincorporated territories petition to incorporate in order to preempt a 
neighboring municipality from annexing them.59 This type of defensive incor-
poration has become increasingly frequent, particularly in unincorporated areas 
surrounding large cities.60 
Given the regularity of municipal incorporation and boundary change, the 
law governing these major events merits understanding and analysis.61 Inter-
estingly, the U.S. Constitution fails to mention municipalities, let alone munic-
ipal incorporation.62 In 1907, in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, a case addressing 
a contentious municipal incorporation, the Supreme Court stated that cities are 
creations of their respective states.63 That is, states can create or modify mu-
nicipalities at any time, with or without the consent of their residents, because 
municipalities are political subdivisions of their states.64 
Consequently, municipalities rely on state constitutions and state general 
laws for the authority to exist and for the authority to exercise power within 
                                                                                                                           
 57 VALENTE ET AL., supra note 30, at 9. 
 58 BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 33, at 220. 
 59 Id. The objective of annexation “is to respond to demands created by expanding urbanization.” 
Robert D. Zeinemann, Overlooked Linkages Between Municipal Incorporation and Annexation Laws: 
An In-Depth Look at Wisconsin’s Experience, 39 URB. LAW. 257, 257 (2007). Because municipalities 
collect property taxes within their borders, they are incentivized to maximize the property value with-
in their boundaries. Id. at 262. Cities can maximize their revenue by extending their borders through 
annexing unincorporated territory. Id. Property owners may receive improved government services 
when a municipality annexes their land, but at the cost of new tax burdens. Id. The courts in Wiscon-
sin are sensitive to the incentives of annexation. Id. at 276. In Smith v. Sherry, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court struck down an annexation, holding that its sole “purpose of increasing the corporate revenues 
by the exaction of taxes [was] an abuse and violation” of the state constitution. 6 N.W. 561, 564 (Wis. 
1880). 
 60 BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 33, at 220. Some states, such as Arizona, Georgia, Illi-
nois, and Montana, are working to limit defensive incorporation by disallowing the practice within a 
certain mileage of existing municipalities without their consent. Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 9-101.01(A) (2020); ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-38-101 (2020); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-31-2 (2020); 65 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/2-2-6 (2020); MO. REV. STAT. § 72.130 (2020)). The minimum distance is usually be-
tween one and six miles, or within the existing municipality’s growth zones. Id. (citing U.S. ADVISORY 
COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELS., STATE LAWS GOVERNING LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUC-
TURE AND ADMINISTRATION 22–23 (1993), https://library.unt.edu/gpo/acir/Reports/information/M-
186.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJ9X-74TV]). 
 61 BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 33, at 206. 
 62 VALENTE ET AL., supra note 30, at 6; see MCQUILLIN, supra note 9, at 51 (explaining that the 
U.S. Constitution “does not mention cities, towns, municipal corporations, or indeed any local organs 
of government”). 
 63 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907). States have “absolute power . . . over the property of municipal cor-
porations.” Id. at 179. 
 64 Id. The Supreme Court held that a state could take property, merge, or dissolve municipalities 
even if the residents protested the state action. Id. 
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their boundaries.65 State constitutions delegate power to political subdivisions, 
such as cities and towns, and state general laws provide the rules for incorpo-
rating new cities and towns.66 Just as municipalities vary in form, size, and 
powers, they also vary in how they are created, altered, and dissolved, based 
on the state at issue.67 
C. The Anatomy of State Municipal Incorporation Laws 
Although state laws concerning municipal incorporation differ in sub-
stance and procedure, every municipal incorporation regime seeks to answer 
fundamental questions with respect to who can incorporate what land, under 
what conditions, and how they can go about doing so.68 First, should a state 
permit residents to incorporate a new municipality in a proposed area?69 Second, 
have the residents adequately determined the boundaries for the proposed incor-
porated area?70 Third, who can decide whether the incorporation should occur 
and what the new municipality’s boundaries should be?71 Lastly, which institu-
tion or institutions should make the final determination on the incorporation?72 
This Section details common characteristics of state municipal incorpora-
tion laws.73 Subsection 1 of this Section describes how states determine 
whether a new municipality is needed.74 Subsection 2 examines how states 
determine the appropriate boundaries for a new municipality.75 Subsection 3 
explains how constitutional doctrine shapes state determinations on who may 
vote to approve or reject a new municipality proposal.76 Lastly, subsection 4 
discusses the parties that have the final say before a new municipality emerg-
es.77 
                                                                                                                           
 65 VALENTE ET AL., supra note 30, at 162. 
 66 Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178; VALENTE ET AL., supra note 30, at 162. Unless otherwise specified in 
a state constitution, state legislatures have “plenary power to create, alter, or abolish at pleasure any or 
all local governmental areas.” MCQUILLIN, supra note 9, at 25. 
 67 VALENTE ET AL., supra note 30, at 162. 
 68 Id. at 162–63. 
 69 Id. at 162. 
 70 Id. at 162–63. 
 71 Id. at 163. Courts are unable to alter incorporation requirements or mandate requirements sur-
passing what is included in an incorporation statute, as long as the incorporation statute does not vio-
late the U.S. Constitution or federal laws. MCQUILLIN, supra note 9, at 352–53 (citing City of Shasta 
Lake v. Cnty. of Shasta, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863 (Ct. App. 1999); Atl. Beach Hotel v. Larkin, 202 
N.Y.S.2d 769 (Sup. Ct. 1960); In re Pewaukee, 521 N.W.2d 453 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994)); see infra 
notes 105–129 and accompanying text (describing how little constitutional law interferes with munic-
ipal incorporation). 
 72 VALENTE ET AL., supra note 30, at 163. 
 73 See infra notes 78–149 and accompanying text. 
 74 See infra notes 78–98 and accompanying text. 
 75 See infra notes 99–104 and accompanying text. 
 76 See infra notes 105–129 and accompanying text. 
 77 See infra notes 130–149 and accompanying text. 
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1. Determining Whether Residents Need a New Municipality Where One 
Does Not Already Exist 
To decide whether and where new municipalities are appropriate, states 
consider: (1) whether there is a need for local government; (2) whether there is 
a capacity for a new government; (3) whether there are local preferences for a 
new government; and (4) what the boundaries would be.78 These inquiries are 
the states’ ways of determining under which circumstances the benefits of in-
corporation would outweigh the costs.79 On the one hand, incorporation gives a 
community control over matters that most affect it, including public services.80 
On the other hand, a new town may bring a new layer of taxation and regula-
tion that may negatively impact local minority populations whose priorities are 
not necessarily represented in municipal decision-making.81 Incorporation also 
may affect the socioeconomic demographics of a county or region of a state, 
oftentimes segregating the population by race or intensifying already existing 
residential segregation.82 
States have different ways of measuring the need for a new local govern-
ment in a particular area and often set conditions precedent for incorporation 
based on these measurements.83 The conditions may pertain to the nature and 
character of the land, the population size and density, or the proximity to other 
cities, towns, or municipalities.84 Some state incorporation statutes limit incor-
poration to urban areas or areas that would accommodate urban development.85 
Incorporation laws may require that the proposed municipality’s residents need 
additional services beyond what the county or state can provide.86 As part of a 
petition for incorporation in Mississippi, for example, residents must demon-
                                                                                                                           
 78 VALENTE ET AL., supra note 30, at 165–66. 
 79 Id. at 165. To distill the inquiry to its core, the law must seek to answer “whether the area needs 
a new local government.” Id. 
 80 Id. For example, incorporation could bring about new road maintenance services. Id. 
 81 Id. Majority rule determines who gets elected to local office, and the elected officials ultimately 
decide which services the municipality will provide and how it will provide them. Id. Majority rule 
also dictates the outcome of local referenda, which have implications for minority populations that are 
similar to those resulting from the election of local officials. Id. 
 82 See Richard Thompson Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Jurisdictional Formation and Ra-
cial Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1389 (1997) (explaining that residents have incorporated 
many suburbs for the specific purpose of segregating individuals based on race, particularly in the 
twentieth century). 
 83 MCQUILLIN, supra note 9, at 349–53; VALENTE ET AL., supra note 30, at 165. 
 84 MCQUILLIN, supra note 9, at 349; VALENTE ET AL., supra note 30, at 165. As of 1993, the mu-
nicipal incorporation laws of forty states had minimum population requirements. VALENTE ET AL., supra 
note 30, at 165 (citing U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELS., supra note 60, at 
22–23). 
 85 VALENTE ET AL., supra note 30, at 165. 
 86 Id. 
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strate either that the incorporation would meet a need for additional services or 
would increase the accessibility of public services.87 
Not only do laws require evidence of public necessity, but they also often 
require evidence of the reasonableness of the incorporation.88 To satisfy this 
requirement, states consider a variety of factors.89 Mississippi courts, for ex-
ample, consider fourteen non-exhaustive factors to determine the reasonable-
ness of incorporating an unincorporated area.90 The factors include the charac-
ter and identity of the community, the costs of incorporation, the estimated tax 
base of the new community, whether the overall well-being of the communi-
ty’s residents will be enhanced, whether transportation will be impacted, and 
whether property owners are supportive of the incorporation, among other con-
siderations.91 
The capacity inquiry typically pertains to municipal financing.92 State 
municipal incorporation laws tend to permit incorporation only when it is evi-
dent that the area has the financial resources to sustain a new layer of govern-
ment.93 In order for a municipality to function, let alone to provide services, it 
needs a sufficient tax base.94 Some states permit municipalities to exercise 
                                                                                                                           
 87 City of Jackson v. Byram Incorporators, 16 So. 3d 662, 671 (Miss. 2009). The petition must 
“state the aims of the petitioners in seeking said incorporation, and shall set forth the municipal and 
public services which said municipal corporation proposes to render and the reasons why the public 
convenience and necessity would be served by the creation of such municipal corporation . . . .” Id. 
(citing MISS. CODE ANN. § 21-1-13 (2020)). The Supreme Court of Mississippi employs five factors 
to assess public convenience and necessity: (1) present government services; (2) how well the gov-
ernment provides those services; (3) what services other sources will provide; (4) how the incorpora-
tion would affect the adjacent city; and (5) the “substantial or obvious need” for the incorporation. Id. 
at 681. The Supreme Court of Mississippi ultimately held that the incorporation “was required by 
public convenience and necessity” because the trial court had found facts demonstrating a need for 
improved sewer, police, and fire services, the capacity to meet those needs through new municipal 
services and the county sheriff’s department, rapid area growth, and a lack of impediment on the ad-
joining city’s future growth. Id. at 681–82. 
 88 MCQUILLIN, supra note 9, at 351–52. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Byram Incorporators, 16 So. 3d at 675. The factors operate as a totality test, with no one factor 
determining reasonableness “per se.” Id. Instead, courts consider all the factors to “reach an ultimate 
conclusion” about the reasonableness of the incorporation. Id. 
 91 Id. Courts might consider who will take over road maintenance and how the municipality will 
address traffic, for example. Id. at 678. For example, in City of Jackson v. Byram Incorporators, the 
Mississippi Supreme Court held that “substantial evidence support[ed] the chancellor’s finding that 
incorporation of the revised [proposed incorporation area was] reasonable” with respect to transporta-
tion. Id. The incorporators convinced the court that traffic “ha[d] gotten out of control” and that the 
new municipality would be able to improve road maintenance services rapidly and “have a positive 
impact on transportation in the area.” Id. The new municipality’s public works department would 
employ one superintendent and two-to-four laborers to address the traffic issue with “a half-ton truck, 
a two-ton flatbed truck with dump body, and a rubber tire hoe.” Id. 
 92 VALENTE ET AL., supra note 30, at 165. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. The Alaska municipal incorporation law, for example, requires evidence that the population 
is “large and stable enough to support” the proposed municipality. Id. (citing ALASKA STAT. 
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what is known as the “Lakewood Plan,” contracting with the county or existing 
municipalities to provide services for the new municipality.95 Other states, 
such as Iowa, do not.96 
Although almost all state municipal incorporation laws take local prefer-
ences into account, they vary in how they evaluate the preferences, how they 
determine which constituencies’ preferences matter, and how they factor these 
preferences into whether an incorporation ultimately occurs.97 Some states re-
quire a percentage of residents to sign a petition to begin the incorporation pro-
cess, some hold referendum elections to approve or reject incorporations, and 
others employ both mechanisms.98 
2. Determining Municipal Boundaries 
Defining where the municipality begins and ends is almost as important 
as deciding whether an area needs a new municipality.99 As with the other 
components of municipal incorporation law, states differ in their approaches 
                                                                                                                           
§ 29.05.031(a)(1) (2020)). Similarly, the Iowa version requires that the new municipality have the 
resources to “provide customary municipal services within a reasonable time.” Id. (citing IOWA CODE 
§ 368.17(1) (2020)). As of 1993, six states’ laws set “a minimum ad valorem tax base” requirement. 
Id. (citing U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELS., supra note 60, at 22–23). The 
term “ad valorem,” translated to mean “according to the value,” refers to “an assessment of taxes 
against property, real or personal, at a certain rate upon its value.” Pratt & Whitney Engine Servs. v. 
Steager, 806 S.E.2d 757, 758–59 n.2 (W. Va. 2017) (citing Smith v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 606 So. 2d 
618, 620 (Fla. 1992)). 
 95 VALENTE ET AL., supra note 30, at 165–66. This arrangement first arose in the 1950s in South-
ern California. Id. at 165. The community of Lakewood contracted with Los Angeles County, which 
provided its municipal services, to reduce municipal government overhead costs. Id. at 166. 
 96 Id. (citing Citizens of Rising Sun v. Rising Sun City Dev. Comm., 528 N.W.2d 597 (Iowa 
1995)); see Laurie Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, Metropolitan Equity, and the New 
Regionalism, 78 WASH. L. REV. 93, 126 n.131 (2003) (arguing that intergovernmental cooperative 
efforts fail to correct the socioeconomic gap between cities and affluent suburbs). In Citizens of Rising 
Sun v. Rising Sun City Development Committee, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the incorporators 
that had submitted a Lakewood Plan for a proposed municipality did not meet their burden of demon-
strating that the proposed municipality would be able “to provide customary municipal services.” 528 
N.W.2d at 600, 601–02; Reynolds, supra, at 126 n.131. 
 97 VALENTE ET AL., supra note 30, at 166; see infra notes 105–129 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing cases that illustrate the variety of constituencies that states permit to vote in municipal incor-
poration and boundary change elections). Within the context of annexation, states can mandate that 
only residents annexing the new territory vote on the matter, that only those residents that are being 
annexed may vote, or that both groups can take part in the vote. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 
U.S. 161, 174–75, 179 (1907) (permitting both the annexing territory and the territory that is being 
annexed to vote); Moorman v. Wood, 504 F. Supp. 467, 468, 471 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (permitting only 
the residents of the annexing city to vote on the annexation, and excluding those residents whose 
property would be annexed from voting). 
 98 VALENTE ET AL., supra note 30, at 166. Often courts will view local preference for incorpora-
tion as evidence in favor of incorporation. Id. 
 99 See id. at 166–67 (highlighting the importance of boundary determinations in the municipal 
incorporation process). 
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regarding boundaries.100 Not only are boundary guidelines about finding the 
ideal municipal size, but they are also intended to prevent conflicts with public 
services, such as police and fire protection, garbage collection, water, and sew-
age.101 Local governments can often provide these types of services only with-
in their boundaries.102 Boundaries frequently are a point of contention, deter-
mining over whom and what the municipality will have authority and how 
much tax revenue the municipality will raise.103 Sometimes incorporators re-
draw boundaries to maximize support for incorporation.104 
3. Who Gets to Vote on Incorporation? 
The question of who gets to decide whether an area can incorporate is 
among the most contentious aspects of municipal incorporation law.105 Some 
states require only the residents of the proposed municipality to vote, whereas 
others, such as Arizona, require the consent of the surrounding area.106 Incor-
poration not only impacts those residing in the new municipality but also the 
surrounding area and, as such, outsiders may be given a say in the incorpora-
tion process.107 
The variety of incorporation referenda systems makes sense when one 
considers how much leeway the Supreme Court gives states in this regard.108 
                                                                                                                           
 100 Id. In Alaska, the population within the boundaries must “be ‘interrelated and integrated as to 
its social, cultural, and economic activities.’” BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 33, at 211 (quot-
ing ALASKA STAT. § 29.05.031(a)(1) (2020)). Some states’ provisions seem to discourage diversity by 
requiring homogeneity. See id. For example, in Wisconsin “the ‘entire territory of the proposed village 
or city shall be reasonably homogeneous and compact.’” Id. (quoting WIS. STAT. § 66.016(1)(a) 
(2020)). Similarly, in Alabama, to incorporate, there must “be ‘a body of citizens whose residences 
are contiguous to and all of which form a homogeneous settlement or community.” Id. (quoting ALA. 
CODE § 11-41-1 (2020)). 
 101 BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 33, at 211; VALENTE ET AL., supra note 30, at 152. 
 102 VALENTE ET AL., supra note 30, at 152. Some states permit localities to deliver services be-
yond their boundaries. Id. at 152–53. 
 103 BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 33, at 211. 
 104 See Terry L. Jones, In or Out? Adjusted St. George Boundaries Confuse Some Early Voters, 
THE ADVOCATE (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/article_31a960a4-
e3b5-11e9-947b-f39023d57a55.html [https://perma.cc/24GP-FKJQ] (explaining critiques that the 
redrawn map for the St. George, Louisiana incorporation excluded condominiums and apartments 
with many residents of color). 
 105 See Green v. City of Tucson, 340 F.3d 891, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding the constitutionali-
ty of an Arizona law requiring the consent of nearby municipalities before incorporating a new munic-
ipality). 
 106 Compare Bray v. Stewart, 214 N.W. 193, 194 (Mich. 1927) (limiting voting eligibility in mu-
nicipal incorporation elections to “only the electors residing within the territory proposed to be incor-
porated” (quoting The Home Rule Village Act, ch. 78, 1909 Mich. Acts 278 § 5, amended by 1919 
Mich. Acts 40 § 5, amended by 1925 Mich. Acts 40 § 5)), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-101.01 
(2020) (prohibiting incorporating a new municipality within an urbanized area without approval by 
the existing city or town). 
 107 BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 33, at 220. 
 108 See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text (introducing the holding from Hunter). 
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At issue in Hunter was the fact that Pittsburgh and Allegheny had consolidated 
even though a majority of Allegheny residents voted against the consolida-
tion.109 The Supreme Court held that the consolidation did not unconstitution-
ally deprive Allegheny voters of due process if a majority of the residents in 
the entire proposed consolidated territory had voted in favor of the consolida-
tion.110 A state may thus constitutionally change municipal boundaries, without 
giving residents the opportunity to vote, because there is no constitutional right 
to vote on municipal incorporation.111 
When states give residents the opportunity to vote, however, they cannot 
do so in any way that conflicts with the Constitution, specifically, with the Fif-
teenth Amendment.112 In 1960, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, the Supreme Court 
held that a state law redefining municipal boundaries could not infringe upon 
the Fifteenth Amendment’s right to vote.113 When African American voters 
                                                                                                                           
 109 207 U.S. 161, 174–75, 179 (1907). Under the Pennsylvania statutory scheme, two cities can 
consolidate if a majority of the residents from both cities vote in favor of it, even if a majority of one 
of the cities opposes the consolidation. Id. at 162–63. At the time of Hunter, the population of Pitts-
burgh was much larger than that of Allegheny. Id. at 165. Pittsburgh had at least 350,000 residents in 
1900, whereas Allegheny had only about 150,000. Id. Even though the Allegheny voters opposed the 
consolidation, the Pittsburgh majority overwhelmed them in the consolidation vote. Id. at 174–75. 
Allegheny voters opposed the consolidation because they did not want to pay taxes toward reducing 
Pittsburgh’s debt. Id. at 165–66. Allegheny voters challenged the consolidation as a deprivation of 
property without due process of law. Id. at 166. 
 110 Id. at 174–75, 179. 
 111 Green v. City of Tucson, 340 F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 2003); see Twp. of Jefferson v. City of 
W. Carrollton, 517 F. Supp. 417, 418, 421 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (upholding a territorial annexation after a 
majority of property owners signed and presented a petition to a board of county commissioners, who 
then held a hearing and approved the annexation), aff’d sub nom. Jefferson Twp. v. W. Carrollton, 718 
F.2d 1099 (6th Cir. 1983). There is no federal right to vote on municipal incorporation. Green, 340 
F.3d at 896. Some states, however, have granted their citizens the right to vote on municipal incorpo-
rations. Id. at 897. In Green v. City of Tucson, the Ninth Circuit held that by “providing for direct 
incorporation[, Arizona] . . . granted qualified voters in unincorporated areas the constitutional equiva-
lent of a right to vote on municipal incorporation.” Id. at 898. 
 112 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 345 (1960); Green, 340 F.3d at 897; see Hunter, 207 
U.S. at 174–75, 179 (granting the franchise to residents of the entire proposed consolidated territory); 
Moorman v. Wood, 504 F. Supp. 467, 468, 471–72, 477 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (applying Hunter and up-
holding a state law that permitted only the annexable Covington residents to vote on the proposed 
annexation, while excluding other Covington residents from voting). Because every state has plenary 
power to modify its subdivisions, its legislature has “broad discretion to adopt the means it deems 
‘necessary and proper’ in complying with the constitutional directive.” Woonsocket Sch. Comm. v. 
Chafee, 89 A.3d 778, 791 (R.I. 2014) (emphasis omitted) (citing In re Request for Advisory Op. from 
the House of Representatives (Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council), 961 A.2d 930, 938 (R.I. 2008)). 
 113 364 U.S. at 345. After World War II, African American voter registration surged in Tuskegee, 
Alabama, challenging the white voters’ control over election outcomes. Jonathan L. Entin, Of Squares 
and Uncouth Twenty-Eight-Sided Figures: Reflections on Gomillion v. Lightfoot After Half a Centu-
ry, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 133, 135, 138 (2010). The Alabama Legislature passed a law changing the 
boundaries of the City of Tuskegee. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 340. The law would effectively remove 
either 395 or 396 of the 400 voters of color from the city boundaries without removing one white 
voter. Id. at 341. The redrawn map removed the Tuskegee Institute, in which a large population of 
middle-class African Americans worked and resided, and a U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs hos-
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challenged the Alabama Legislature’s redrawing of the city of Tuskegee, which 
had the effect of excluding voters of color from Tuskegee, the Court found that 
the voters adequately pled a Fifteenth Amendment claim.114 The redrawn map 
exclusively deprived voters of color of their right to vote, while maintaining 
white voters’ right to vote in the city.115 Gomillion stands for the proposition 
that if a state alters municipal boundaries with the specific intent of depriving 
individuals of color of the right to vote, the state has violated the Fifteenth 
Amendment.116 
Following the Gomillion decision, federal courts have continued to defer 
to states’ authority for choosing the electoral methods of their municipal 
boundary changes, unless there is evidence of racial discrimination.117 Without 
                                                                                                                           
pital for African American veterans, from the city. Entin, supra, at 133, 134–35. Civil rights attorney 
Fred Gray, in arguing for the petitioners, contested that the law changed “Tuskegee from a square to a 
‘25 sided sea dragon.’” Leonard S. Rubinowitz, The Courage of Civil Rights Lawyers: Fred Gray and 
His Colleagues, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1227, 1238 (2017) (quoting FRED D. GRAY, BUS RIDE TO 
JUSTICE 113 (rev. ed. 2013)). In a revealing back-and-forth during oral argument for the case, Justice 
Frankfurter, who would go on to write the opinion, asked Fred Gray to point out a map of the new 
Tuskegee in which the Tuskegee Institute was situated. Id. at 1238–39 n.44. Gray responded that the 
Institute was no longer within the boundaries of the city. Id. According to Gray, the map ultimately 
persuaded Justice Frankfurter to hold that the petitioners had adequately pled a Fifteenth Amendment 
claim. Id. The Fifteenth Amendment established universal male suffrage, stating: “The right of citi-
zens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State 
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 114 Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 345; see supra note 113 and accompanying text (quoting the language 
of the Fifteenth Amendment). 
 115 Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341. The act of the Alabama Legislature exceeded “an ordinary geo-
graphic redistricting measure even within familiar abuses of gerrymandering.” Id. If the facts were 
true, then the Alabama Legislature passed the act only to segregate white voters and voters of color. 
Id. It is important to note, though, that the Court held that the petitioners in Gomillion did not plead facts 
to sustain a Fourteenth Amendment claim. Id. at 343. Under Hunter and similar cases, the Supreme 
Court explained, in Gomillion, that there is no contractual relationship that is constitutionally protect-
ed between a state and its municipalities such that a change in municipal boundaries would give rise to 
a Due Process claim. Id. Justice Frankfurter’s majority opinion did not discuss the merits of the Equal 
Protection Clause claim. See id. at 340, 343, 348 (overturning the lower courts’ dismissal of petition-
ers’ constitutional complaint based on Fifteenth Amendment grounds, but rejecting the appeal on 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process grounds without deliberating on the merits of an Equal Protec-
tion Clause claim). In a concurring opinion, Justice Charles E. Whittaker argued that the Supreme 
Court should have decided the case on Equal Protection Clause grounds instead of the Fifteenth 
Amendment. Id. at 349 (Whittaker, J., concurring). To Justice Whittaker, the Alabama act illegally 
segregated its population by race, and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause as understood in 
Brown. Id. (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). 
 116 Id. at 346 (majority opinion). 
 117 See Moorman, 504 F. Supp. at 468, 477 (affirming a city’s annexation of adjacent unincorpo-
rated territory where only the city residents could vote on the annexation and not those being an-
nexed). For example, in its 1980 decision in Moorman v. Wood, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Kentucky applied Hunter and affirmed a city’s annexation in which only the residents of the 
territory to be annexed could vote, but not the remaining residents who would suffer population loss. Id. 
at 471–73, 477. The annexation did not violate the Equal Protection Clause rights of the city residents 
that were barred from voting. Id. at 474. The petitioners did not bring a Fifteenth Amendment claim. 
See id. at 471 (explaining that the petitioners brought a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
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evidence of racial discrimination, a plaintiff does not have standing to bring a 
Fourteenth Amendment claim against a state statute defining or changing mu-
nicipal boundaries.118 
In 1977, the Supreme Court added a gloss to Hunter with its ruling in 
Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action at the Local Level, Inc.119 In Lock-
port, although a majority of city residents in the county voted in favor of a 
county referendum to restructure its government, a majority of the residents of 
the unincorporated area voted against it.120 The Court held that the residents of 
the unincorporated area had sufficiently different interests in the election out-
come from their city counterparts because those in the unincorporated area did 
not have city services to fall back on if the county services declined.121 The 
outcome of the election, therefore, did not violate the city dwellers’ Equal Pro-
tection rights because of their different interests.122 Lockport shows that courts 
are cognizant of groups’ different interests in state subdivision elections.123 If 
different constituencies have sufficiently different interests in the outcome of 
an election, then a state that gives only the more interested group the right to 
vote in the election would not be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.124 
States have interpreted the Hunter-Gomillion-Lockport doctrinal trifecta 
as a greenlight to restructure municipal boundaries in a variety of ways.125 Ac-
cording to Hunter, municipalities are creatures of their respective states and 
thus states can arrange municipalities as they see fit.126 Under Lockport, if 
states hold elections for municipal life-cycle events or boundary changes, they 
                                                                                                                           
Clause claim). The court in large part based its decision on Hunter, emphasizing that despite the voting 
rights cases, Hunter still protected the wide latitude of states to formulate their political subdivisions. Id. 
at 472–73. The court further noted that “Hunter is still good law,” except as affected by the voting 
rights cases and where states have reconfigured political subdivisions “for invidious racial motives or 
in other situations involving a clear denial of due process or equal protection.” Id. at 473.  
 118 Id. at 472–73. The court explained that “a state statute directly placing a citizen in a particular 
city or county, or changing by the redrawing of boundary lines the political subdivision in which he 
resides, or providing some procedure where that may be done, may not be attacked under the due 
process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, except in certain very restricted 
circumstances.” Id. 
 119 430 U.S. 259, 271–72 (1977). 
 120 Id. at 262, 272–73. 
 121 Id. at 272–73. 
 122 Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (prohibiting any state from “deny[ing] to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”). 
 123 430 U.S. at 271–72. 
 124 Id. 
 125 See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 345, 347 (1960) (clarifying that states cannot 
change municipal boundaries with the specific intent of depriving people of color of the right to vote 
in municipal elections); Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907) (giving states the gen-
eral flexibility to arrange their boundary change processes however they see fit, with or without re-
quiring elections); infra note 129 and accompanying text (detailing how courts have applied Hunter, 
Gomillion, and Lockport). 
 126 207 U.S. at 178–79. 
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can subsequently restrict the electorate if voters have distinct interests in the 
outcome of the election.127 The only constraint on both Hunter and Lockport is 
the holding of Gomillion, which prohibits a state from engaging in invidious 
discrimination through municipal life-cycle votes.128 Consequently, federal 
courts have been accommodating of most state municipal incorporation, disso-
lution, annexation, and secession methods.129 
4. Who Gets the Final Say on Incorporation? 
Municipal referendum elections, where state incorporation statutes re-
quire them, are not the sole procedural check on incorporation.130 Courts have 
pivotal roles in many state incorporation regimes.131 Some statutes, such as 
that of Arkansas, require courts to make substantive decisions as part of the 
process.132 On the other end of the spectrum, in Texas, courts may only certify 
that petitioners have fulfilled all the objective criteria.133 Mississippi’s law falls 
                                                                                                                           
 127 430 U.S. at 272–73. 
 128 364 U.S. at 346. 
 129 See Lockport, 430 U.S. at 272–73 (affirming the decision not to annex after a majority of vot-
ers in the unincorporated territory voted against the annexation, even though a majority of the entire 
voting population within the proposed boundaries voted in support of the annexation); Hunter, 207 
U.S. at 174–75, 179 (establishing a franchise for the entire proposed consolidated territory, even 
though urban voters would end up controlling the outcome at the expense of voters in the unincorpo-
rated territory); Moorman v. Wood, 504 F. Supp. 467, 468, 477 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (affirming a city’s 
annexation of adjacent unincorporated territory where only the city residents were permitted to vote 
on the annexation, and not those to be annexed); Murphy v. Kansas City, 347 F. Supp. 837, 838, 847 
(W.D. Mo. 1972) (affirming an annexation where only the existing city dwellers could vote, and not 
the people to be annexed). For example, in 1972, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Mis-
souri denied injunctive relief to Platte County residents who were annexed into Kansas City without 
being given the ability to vote on the matter. Murphy, 347 F. Supp. at 838, 847. The court cited Hunter, 
explaining that Kansas City was merely exercising the authority granted to it by the state of Missouri. Id. 
at 847. Kansas City could extend its boundaries without permission from the Platt County residents 
who would be annexed. Id. at 838, 847. The court distinguished the case from Gomillion and other 
voting rights cases by reasoning that the residents of the unincorporated territory to be annexed were 
not residents of the city yet, and therefore had not been denied the right to vote in the city election. See 
id. at 844 (distinguishing the circumstances of Murphy v. Kansas City from those of Gomillion). The 
court held that Missouri had a rational basis for differentiating the voting process for annexing unin-
corporated territory from that of unincorporated territory. Id. at 847. The court found that there was a 
difference between replacing municipal government services with new ones and forming a new mu-
nicipal government where only a county government had existed. Id. at 846. Requiring voter approval 
for one and not the other, therefore, was reasonable. Id.  
 130 BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 33, at 221. 
 131 Id. at 209. 
 132 Id. (citing White v. Lorings, 623 S.W.2d 837 (Ark. 1981)). 
 133 Id. (citing In re Fitzgerald, 140 S.W.3d 380 (Tex. 2004)). A Texas appellate court reversed the 
trial court’s rejection of an incorporation in the 2004 case In re Fitzgerald, holding that the trial court 
was permitted only to verify that the petition was properly filed, and could not make findings about 
whether the territory was primarily rural. Id. 
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somewhere in the middle, restricting the judicial role in some matters but 
granting independence on others.134 
In Pennsylvania, incorporators file a petition for incorporation with the 
trial court which then appoints a Borough Advisory Committee made up of 
residents of the proposed borough and the surrounding area.135 The Advisory 
Committee reviews the petition, holds hearings, and issues a report to the trial 
court either in support of or against the incorporation.136 The trial court can 
stray from the Borough Advisory Committee’s recommendations, but when 
that decision is appealed the appellate court must review the decision.137 
Even when a state statute does not include judicial certification, it typical-
ly includes judicial recourse for affected people to appeal incorporation deci-
sions.138 The Louisiana statute, for example, lists three people or entities that 
can contest incorporation: (1) an elector living in the area to be incorporated; 
(2) anyone owning land in the area to be incorporated; and (3) neighboring 
                                                                                                                           
 134 Id. (citing Fletcher v. Diamondhead Incorporators, 77 So. 3d 92 (Miss. 2011)). In Fletcher v. 
Diamondhead, although the court could only examine “compliance with technical criteria, such as 
number of signatures on a petition,” it had the discretion to consider “whether the voter rolls actually 
show the number of qualified voters in an area.” Id. 
 135 In re Incorporation of Bridgewater, 488 A.2d 374, 375 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985). Pennsylvania has 
counties, cities, boroughs, and townships. Irina Zhorov, Explainer: Cities, Boroughs, and Townships, Oh 
My! Pa. Municipalities Clarified, WHYY (Apr. 4, 2016), https://whyy.org/articles/explainer-cities-
boroughs-and-townships-oh-my-pa-municipalities-clarified/ [https://perma.cc/VS6W-XY59]. In 
Pennsylvania, boroughs are usually smaller than cities. Id. They typically have fewer than five thou-
sand residents. Id. Most boroughs follow a weak mayor system in that the elected borough council 
wields most of the power. Id. In one case, In re Incorporation of Bridgewater, residents proposed to 
incorporate Bridgewater (also known as Toby Farms) as a borough within the Chester Township of 
Pennsylvania. 488 A.2d at 375. The trial court appointed a five-member Borough Advisory Commit-
tee, which looked at the consequences of incorporating on the Township’s demographic composition. 
Id. Without incorporating Bridgewater, Chester Township was 59% white and 41% people of color. 
Id. at 376. If Bridgewater were to incorporate, Chester Township would become 82.5% white and 
17.4% people of color, while the rest of the township, without Bridgewater, would be 26.6% white 
and 73% people of color. Id. The Borough Advisory Committee recommended that the trial court 
deny Bridgewater’s petition for incorporation, citing segregationist motivations for incorporation and 
concerns that Bridgewater residents were trying to avoid contributing to paying off the township’s 
debts. Id. The trial court followed the Borough Advisory Committee’s recommendations and denied 
the petition. Id. at 375. The appellate court affirmed the denial and stated that, with the incorporation, 
the township would lose the “support and balance which is essential to preserve and develop a com-
plete, integrated and, yet, diverse community of population interests, and uses; all of which are essen-
tial to the stability and growth of the suburban municipality.” Id. at 377. 
 136 Bridgewater, 488 A.2d at 375. 
 137 See In re Incorporation of the Chilton, 646 A.2d 13, 16–17 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (overturn-
ing the trial court’s decision to grant incorporation against the recommendation of the Borough Advi-
sory Commission, and clarifying that the trial court had the discretion to weigh factors unspecified in 
the state code, which were discussed in the Borough Advisory Committee’s report). 
 138 See LA. STAT. ANN. § 33:4(A) (2020) (providing interested parties with the right to contest 
incorporations); infra notes 158–201 and accompanying text (discussing Louisiana’s incorporation 
statute). After incorporators have succeeded in winning their incorporation vote, it may be too late for 
other residents to contest the incorporation. See infra notes 158–201 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing litigation following the St. George, Louisiana incorporation election). 
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municipalities that an incorporation would negatively impact, or an elected offi-
cial of the affected municipalities.139 If the district court grants the incorporation 
anyway, then anyone who filed a petition contesting the proposed incorporation 
or a voter residing in the area to be incorporated can appeal the decision.140 
In a growing number of states, the county legislature, county committee, 
or state administrators are the ultimate decision-makers.141 In Kansas, after 
holding a hearing on the proposed incorporation, the county legislature issues 
the decision.142 Alternatively, in California, a county-level committee reviews 
the incorporation petition and grants approval or denies it.143 Some states, such 
as Minnesota and Oregon, appoint state administrative bodies to preside over 
incorporation decisions.144 In Oregon, for example, the Land Use Board of 
Appeals reviews proposals for incorporation.145 
These state and county administrative bodies consider whether incorpora-
tion is in the best interest of the region or state, taking care to avoid unneces-
sary incorporations near metropolitan areas.146 To make these decisions, they 
assess political activity, fiscal data, geography, land use, transportation infra-
structure, and the demographics of the area, among other factors.147 State and 
county-level review of incorporation successfully has curtailed the propagation 
of numerous, small new municipalities.148 
Together with the aforementioned three elements of an incorporation re-
gime—local government need, municipal boundaries, and the relevant elec-
                                                                                                                           
 139 LA. STAT. ANN. § 33:4(A). 
 140 Id. § 33:5. 
 141 BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 33, at 221–22. 
 142 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 15-123 (2020); BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 33, at 221. 
 143 BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 33, at 221 (citing CAL. GOV’T CODE § 56826 (West 
2020)). The committee is called a Local Agency Formation Commission. Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. The Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) “has exclusive jurisdiction to review all govern-
mental land use decisions, whether legislative or quasi-judicial in nature.” Land Use Board of Ap-
peals, OREGON.GOV, https://www.oregon.gov/luba/Pages/index.aspx [https://web.archive.org/web/
20190912081715/https://www.oregon.gov/LUBA/Pages/index.aspx]. The Oregon Legislature estab-
lished the LUBA in 1979. Id. It has three members, each of whom is an attorney appointed by the 
governor. Frequently Asked Questions, OREGON.GOV, https://www.oregon.gov/luba/Pages/Frequently-
Asked-Questions.aspx [https://perma.cc/3ZKA-GF33]. “LUBA hears and rules on appeals of land use 
decisions made by local governments and special districts.” Id. 
 146 BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 33, at 222 (citing Pleasant Prairie v. Dep’t of Local 
Affairs & Dev., 334 N.W.2d 893, 900 (Wisc. 1983)). The administrative bodies consider the proposed 
municipal incorporation through “political, economic, fiscal, demographic, geographic, land use, [and] 
transportation” lenses. Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Briffault, supra note 28, at 83. State administrative bodies do not typically have the power to 
eliminate existing local governments or force mergers. Id. 
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torate—which entity has the final say and what criteria it considers have impli-
cations for the racial and socioeconomic makeup of the state.149 
II. CASE STUDIES: LOUISIANA, CALIFORNIA, AND ARIZONA 
Incorporation is a politically charged process in any state.150 Nevertheless, a 
state’s specific incorporation requirements and processes often shape how, and 
among whom, the political fights take place.151 The methods by which states 
manage the municipal life cycle have significant implications for the socioeco-
nomic and demographic patterns in rural, suburban, and urban communities.152 
This Part explores the state municipal incorporation regimes of Louisiana, Cali-
fornia, and Arizona.153 Section A of this Part discusses Louisiana’s municipal 
incorporation landscape.154 Section B explores California’s processes.155 Section 
C concludes the tri-state analysis with an explanation of Arizona’s municipal 
incorporation laws.156 These three states’ municipal incorporation laws are sam-
ples of the diversity in incorporation processes throughout the United States.157 
A. Louisiana 
Out of the three states that this Part examines, Louisiana has the fewest 
obstacles to incorporate an unincorporated area.158 The state’s incorporation 
                                                                                                                           
 149 See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 33, at 219 (describing how municipal incorporation 
affects racial, ethnic, and class composition of a region of a state). Between the summer of 1973 and 
the winter of 1974, there were 104 municipal boundary change incidents—incorporations, annexa-
tions, detachments, mergers, consolidations, or dissolutions—in the United States. Donald G. Hag-
man, Symposium, The White Curtain: Racially Disadvantaging Local Government Boundary Practic-
es: Introduction and Summary, 54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 681, 697 (1977). The boundary changes disad-
vantaged people of color in fifty-four of those 104 incidents through at least one of five ways: “school 
segregation, the dilution of voting strength, the denial of quality services, the denial of housing, and 
disadvantageous taxation.” Gayle Binion, Chapter 2: Incident Survey and Analysis, 54 U. DET. J. 
URB. L. 695, 703–04 (1977). 
 150 See JR Ball, JR Ball: St. George About a Political Divide, Not a Racial One, GREATER BATON 
ROUGE BUS. REP. (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.businessreport.com/opinions/st-george-political-divide-
baton-rouge [https://perma.cc/565Z-6BSK] (exploring the complicated dynamics of the St. George, 
Louisiana incorporation). 
 151 See infra notes 158–282 and accompanying text. 
 152 See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 33, at 219 (explaining that municipal borders impact 
the racial makeup of an area and that “[r]acial, ethnic, and class concerns have long played an im-
portant role in local government formation”); see also Binion, supra note 149, at 703–04 (citing data 
demonstrating that boundary changes significantly disadvantaged people of color between 1973 and 
1974). 
 153 See infra notes 158–282 and accompanying text. 
 154 See infra notes 158–201 and accompanying text. 
 155 See infra notes 202–235 and accompanying text. 
 156 See infra notes 236–282 and accompanying text. 
 157 See infra notes 158–282 and accompanying text. 
 158 Compare LA. STAT. ANN. § 33:1–3 (2020) (requiring that incorporators collect signatures of 
25% of only residents of the proposed municipality, submit a petition to the governor, and then hold 
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procedure includes: (1) a petition for incorporation; (2) the governor’s review 
of that petition; and (3) a special election wherein only electors residing within 
the area proposed for incorporation can vote.159 
The first step to incorporate an unincorporated area in Louisiana is to 
compile a petition.160 After the chair files the petition with the secretary of 
state and receives an endorsement, the secretary of state submits the petition 
for certification in each parish within which the municipality will exist.161 The 
registrar of voters for each parish then tells the chair how many electors reside 
in that parish’s portion of the municipality.162 The chair must gather signatures 
of at least twenty-five percent of the electors living in the proposed area.163 
                                                                                                                           
an election among only those residing in the proposed municipality), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-
101.01 (2020) (requiring organizers of proposed municipalities within urbanized areas to obtain con-
sent of the neighboring municipalities that make the area urban). 
 159 LA. STAT. ANN. § 33:1–3. The Louisiana state legislature enacted the state’s current municipal 
incorporation law in 1984. 1984 La. Acts 536, §§ 21–27. 
 160 LA. STAT. ANN. § 33:1. The petition must either be on the approved petition form or provide 
the same information as the approved form. Id. § 33:1(A). Otherwise, the petition is invalid. Id. A 
petition must include the desired name of the proposed municipality, “a legal description of the area,” 
a map, and a list of every parish within which the proposed municipality is located. Id. § 33:1(A)(1), 
(5). A petition must certify that the entire geography of the proposed municipality is contiguous. Id. 
§ 33:1(A)(1). Additionally, a petition must state the number of residents in the proposed municipality, 
based on the latest federal census or a similar verifiable report. Id. § 33:1(A)(2). The area must have a 
population of at least two hundred residents. Id. § 33:1(A). The proponents must state the assessed 
land value within the proposed municipality as well. Id. § 33:1(A)(3). A petition must also list the 
public services that the municipality will provide and explain how the municipality will provide them. 
Id. § 33:1(A)(4). Lastly, the petition must identify a chair and vice-chair for the incorporation process. 
Id. § 33:1(A)(6). The chair and vice chair are the agents for legal purposes, and “[n]otice will be suffi-
cient if served on the chairperson or vice chairperson.” Id. 
 161 Id. § 33:1(B)(1). It is not uncommon for municipalities to straddle parish lines. See LORI L. 
SMITH, SE. LA. UNIV., LOUISIANA DIRECTORY OF CITIES, TOWNS, AND VILLAGES 4–42 (2005), 
https://docplayer.net/15486828-Louisiana-directory-of-cities-towns-and-villages-lori-l-smith-sims-
memorial-library-southeastern-louisiana-university.html [https://perma.cc/9YNG-K9BA] (matching 
the cities, towns, and villages of Louisiana to their parishes). The secretary of state notifies the chair 
of the filing date within ten business days of the filing. LA. STAT. ANN. § 33:1(B)(1)(a). The chair 
cannot file a petition for incorporation within thirteen days of an upcoming election, or until ten days 
have passed since an election. Id. § 33:1(B)(1)(c). Within the window for certification, no municipali-
ty may annex an area that is part of the proposed municipality. Id. § 33:1(G). The registrar of voters 
will have already seen the petition because the chair must provide notice to the registrar of voters for 
each parish of the chair’s intention to submit the petition to the secretary of state at least fourteen days 
before submitting the petition to the secretary of state. Id. § 33:1(C)(2). 
 162 LA. STAT. ANN. § 33:1(B)(1)(b). 
 163 Id. § 33:1(C)(1). The chair then submits the petition, with the signatures, to the registrar of 
voters. Id. § 33:1(C)(2). The signatures must “reasonably correspond” with the electors’ signatures on 
file in the registrar’s offices. Id. § 33:1(D)(1). If there are under ten thousand qualified electors in the 
proposed municipality, the chair must submit the petition with signatures within 180 days of the secre-
tary of state endorsing the petition. Id. § 33:1(C)(2)(a). If there are more than ten thousand qualified 
voters in the proposed municipality, the chair must submit the petition with signatures for the registrar 
of voters’ certification within 270 days of the endorsement date. Id. § 33:1(C)(2)(b). When the chair 
submits the petition and signatures, the chair must also submit “an affidavit attesting to the fact that no 
signatures were obtained prior to the receipt of notice of the endorsement date.” Id. § 33:1(C)(3)(a). If 
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Electors who sign a petition may withdraw their signatures within five days of 
the chair submitting the petition.164 If the petition has enough signatures, the 
registrar or registrar of voters certifies the petition and sends it to the governor 
for review.165 Next, the governor checks to see that the petition complies with 
the requirements, including that the proposed municipality has at least two 
hundred residents.166 The governor then schedules a special election, in which 
only electors residing within the proposed municipality may vote.167 
Three types of people or entities have standing to contest the incorpora-
tion in district court: (1) an elector living in the to-be-incorporated area; (2) a 
landowner in the to-be-incorporated area; and (3) a municipality or elected 
official of a municipality that could be adversely affected by the incorpora-
tion.168 The district court considers the reasonableness of the incorporation and 
whether the municipality would be able to provide the public services as pro-
posed within in a timely manner.169 As part of this determination, the district 
court evaluates the possible negative impacts of incorporation on neighboring 
municipalities.170 Depending on the findings, the district court will either order 
the incorporation or deny the incorporation.171 Either party may appeal the dis-
trict court’s holding.172 
The most recent Louisiana incorporation vote occurred in St. George.173 
St. George is an unincorporated area of East Baton Rouge Parish.174 The de-
                                                                                                                           
the chair does not meet the deadline for filing, then the petition is null and void and the chair must 
wait at least sixty days to start the process anew. Id. § 33:1(C)(3)(b). If, after submitting the petition, 
the registrar of voters informs the chair that fewer than 25% of the electors signed the petition, the 
chair has up to sixty more days to find additional signatures. Id. § 33:2(B). 
 164 Id. § 33:1(D)(2). 
 165 Id. § 33:2(C). 
 166 Id. § 33:3(A). 
 167 Id. § 33:3(A), (B). If a majority of voters decide to vote against incorporation, the incorpora-
tors must wait two years before beginning the process again. Id. § 33:3(C). If, however, a majority 
votes in favor of the incorporation, the area will be legally incorporated after thirty days unless some-
one contests the incorporation within that period. Id. § 33:3(D). 
 168 Id. § 33:4(A). Any of these parties may file a petition in district court and serve the chair with 
a summons. Id. § 33:4(B). If there is more than one petition, the court will consolidate the actions into 
one matter. Id. The district court can appoint a noninterested party as a commissioner to convene 
hearings and to file a recommendation with the district court, stipulating the commissioner’s factual 
and legal conclusions. Id. § 33:4(C). 
 169 Id. § 33:4(D). The district court also checks for incorporation procedural compliance. Id. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. § 33:4(E)(1), (2)(a). If the district court denies the incorporation, and the incorporators do 
not appeal in a timely manner, the proponents of the incorporation may not submit another petition 
within two years of the denial. Id. § 33:4(E)(2)(b). 
 172 Id. § 33:5. If the incorporation succeeds, the governor will appoint officers to hold office until 
the next municipal election. Id. § 33:6. 
 173 Stephanie Riegel, Baton Rouge Inches Closer to Lawsuit Against St. George with “Litigation 
Hold Notice,” GREATER BATON ROUGE BUS. REP. (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.businessreport.com/
business/news-alert-city-inches-closer-to-lawsuit-against-st-george-with-litigation-hold-notice [https://
perma.cc/YF22-M8W4]. 
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mographics of the St. George area are unrepresentative of the broader Parish—
St. George is less than 15% black, whereas East Baton Rouge Parish is about 
46.5% black.175 The mean household income of St. George is approximately 
thirty thousand dollars higher than the city of Baton Rouge.176 In explaining 
the motivation to secede from the East Baton Rouge Parish school district and 
create their own Southeast Community School District, the predominantly 
white, wealthy St. George parents reasoned that East Baton Rouge Parish 
schools have historically underperformed.177 The parents, however, failed to 
gather sufficient support for school district succession twice, once in 2012 and 
                                                                                                                           
 174 Stephanie Riegel, St. George Votes to Incorporate . . . Now What?, GREATER BATON ROUGE 
BUS. REP. (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.businessreport.com/business/st-george-ncorporates-now-
what-baton-rouge [https://perma.cc/MSF3-656X]; see supra note 2 and accompanying text (explain-
ing that a parish is Louisiana’s version of a county). St. George is sixty square miles. Riegel, supra. 
East Baton Rouge Parish and the City of Baton Rouge consolidated into a single form of government 
in 1947. Id.; Our Government, supra note 13. Because of the consolidation, a single government man-
ages both East Baton Rouge Parish and the City of Baton Rouge. Our Government, supra note 13. 
The consolidation “enabled economies of scale and empowered elected officials to make spending 
decisions based on what was best for the rapidly growing parish, not just the particular pockets where 
tax dollars were generated.” Riegel, supra. In 1982, citizens of Baton Rouge Parish voted to further 
consolidate the two entities by merging the City and Parish Councils into one—the Metropolitan 
Council. Our Government, supra note 13. The Metropolitan Council promulgates policies for the 
City-Parish by managing the budget and passing legislation. Id. The Mayor-President, who is both the 
Mayor of the City of Baton Rouge and the Parish President, manages the daily City and Parish func-
tions, and also appoints and supervises most department heads. Id. The Mayor-President appoints and 
may remove the Finance Director, Purchasing Agent, Personnel Administrator, Fire Chief, and the 
Police Chief, as well as the heads of many departments, including Environmental Sciences, Transpor-
tation and Drainage, Maintenance, Development, Buildings and Grounds, Fleet Management, and the 
Office of Business Operations and Capital Programs. CITY OF BATON ROUGE & PARISH OF EAST 
BATON ROUGE, THE PLAN OF GOVERNMENT OF THE PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE AND THE CITY 
OF BATON ROUGE §§ 4.03, 5.01, 5.02 (last amended 2015) [hereinafter THE PLAN OF GOVERNMENT]. 
In lieu of a “Home Rule Charter,” voters from the Parish approved a “Plan of Government,” in 1947, 
which outlines the organization of the government. Id. 
 175 Harris, supra note 6. The Baton Rouge Public Schools were under a desegregation order that 
had been instituted in 1956, after Brown v. Board of Education. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); Harris, 
supra note 6. The order was lifted in 2003, making it the longest post-Brown desegregation order. 
Harris, supra note 6. When a federal judge lifted the desegregation order in 2003, the school district 
was 75% black. Id. By 2019, after three communities incorporated as their own cities and left the 
Parish school district, the school was 81% black and 89% students of color. Id. 
 176 Runnels, supra note 8, at 66. At least 60% of the households in Baton Rouge have incomes 
below fifty thousand dollars, whereas at least 60% of St. George households have incomes above fifty 
thousand dollars. Id. 
 177 Tom Gogola, The Jim Crow Soft-Shoe Segregationists of St. George, THE BAFFLER (July 2014), 
https://thebaffler.com/salvos/the-jim-crow-soft-shoe-segregationists-of-st-george [https://perma.cc/
4FH7-WRPS]; Harris, supra note 6. Louisiana State Senator Mack “Bodi” White filed the bill in 
March 2013 to create a St. George breakaway school district. Runnels, supra note 8, at 63–64. The 
bill passed the House of Representatives, but failed in the Senate. Id. at 64. According to a Baton 
Rouge Area Chamber study, about six out of every ten students in the East Baton Rouge Public 
School District attended a school that was either “failing” or “almost failing” in the 2011–2012 aca-
demic school year. Gogola, supra. Additionally, 20% of high school students dropped out of school 
during the 2011–2012 school term. Id. 
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again in 2013.178 Eventually, the St. George residents realized that they would 
have a better chance of creating their own school district if they incorporated 
as their own city.179 
The parents launched an incorporation campaign in 2015.180 They gath-
ered at least eighteen thousand signatures, but then lost one thousand of them 
to a withdrawal campaign.181 In the end, the St. George incorporation support-
ers were just seventy-one signatures short of the threshold to add incorporation 
to the next ballot.182 In 2018, they adjusted the boundaries of the proposed city 
and tried again.183 By February 2019, the St. George incorporation supporters 
had amassed a sufficient number of signatures to hold an incorporation vote 
later that year, in which only residents of St. George could vote.184 Then, on 
October 12, 2019, the residents of St. George went to the polls and fifty-four 
percent of them voted in favor of the incorporation.185 The City of Baton 
Rouge estimated that St. George’s cessation from the City-Parish consolidated 
government would reduce the City-Parish’s annual revenues by $48.3 million, 
which in turn would require the government to either increase taxes or cut ser-
vices and expenditures by forty-five percent.186 
                                                                                                                           
 178 Harris, supra note 6. 
 179 Id. The St. George parents simply followed the blueprint of their neighbors in Central, Louisi-
ana. Id. After the parents in Central failed to convince the state legislature to create a new school dis-
trict in 2005, Central incorporated as a city and created its own school district in 2007. Id. 
 180 Id. The proposed city would be about eighty-five square miles and have 107,000 residents. 
Jones, supra note 104. 
 181 Harris, supra note 6. A group named Better Together led the withdrawal campaign, going door 
to door to speak with residents about the consequences of incorporation. Id. Advocates of the incorpo-
ration, those particularly situated in the eastern part of the proposed municipality, argued that it would 
improve the schools and empower St. George residents to have better control over how their tax dol-
lars were being spent. Riegel, supra note 174. In contrast, their neighbors in the western part of St. 
George were older, wealthier, and more in favor of maintaining a strong city-parish government. Id. In 
fact, residents in six western St. George neighborhoods circulated annexation petitions to join the City 
of Baton Rouge, instead of incorporating. Id. 
 182 Harris, supra note 6. 
 183 Id.; Jones, supra note 104. The proposed city would be sixty square miles and have eighty-six 
thousand residents. Jones, supra note 104. Opponents of the incorporation criticized the new map, 
accusing the incorporators of carving out condominiums and apartments in which many residents of 
color and low-income residents lived. Harris, supra note 6; Jones, supra note 104. Whereas the popu-
lation in the 2015 proposal was 20% Black, the population in the new proposal was only 12% Black. 
Sophie Kasakove, The School Secession Movement Is Growing. That’s Bad News for Integration, 
NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 15, 2019), https://newrepublic.com/article/155369/school-secession-movement-
growing-thats-bad-news-integration [https://perma.cc/AM43-AXLZ]. In response to the accusations, 
the St. George incorporators posted the following message on the group’s Facebook page: “If a pre-
cinct had a small percentage of signatures and clearly did not want to be in the new city, they were not 
included in the updated boundaries.” Harris, supra note 6.  
 184 Harris, supra note 6. 
 185 Rojas, supra note 2. 
 186 Kasakove, supra note 183. For context, the City-Parish generated $316,347,122 in total reve-
nues for the General Fund in 2018. MARSHA J. HANLON, FIN. DEP’T, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FI-
NANCIAL REPORT: THE CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT OF THE CITY OF BATON ROUGE AND PARISH 
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Under state law, parties have thirty days to challenge the incorporation 
before it goes into effect.187 Only three days after the vote, East Baton Rouge 
Parish Mayor-President Sharon Weston Broome announced that the City-
Parish consolidated government was exploring its legal options.188 On Novem-
ber 4, 2019, Mayor-President Broome, joined by a St. George elector and a 
Baton Rouge resident, filed a complaint in the Nineteenth Judicial District 
Court, challenging the incorporation under section 33:4(B) of the Louisiana 
Revised Statutes.189 They argued that the incorporation process was fatally 
flawed because the incorporation petition treated the provision of certain pub-
lic services as optional.190 They also contended that the incorporation was un-
reasonable because it would have a significant negative impact on the City-
Parish.191 Moreover, the plaintiffs argued that the incorporation violated the 
City-Parish Plan of Government, which prohibited the incorporation of new 
cities within the parish.192 Under the Plan of Government, creating a new mu-
                                                                                                                           
OF EAST BATON ROUGE, LOUISIANA, at Exhibit A-5 (2018), https://www.brla.gov/DocumentCenter/
View/7506/2018-CAFR-PDF [https://perma.cc/3E2Z-5HB3]. 
 187 LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 33:3(D), 4(A) (2020). 
 188 Riegel, supra note 174. Mayor-President Broome said she was keen on “find[ing] a path for-
ward that was best for ALL the citizens of the parish, not a portion of our population.” Id. 
 189 Terry L. Jones & Blake Paterson, St. George Incorporation in Limbo After Mayor, Others Sue 
to Stop Creation of New City, THE ADVOCATE (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_
rouge/news/article_1a07709a-fb65-11e9-81e7-9fcc950f12f5.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20210
222020355/https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/article_1a07709a-fb65-11e9-81e7-9fcc
950f12f5.html]. Private donors financed the lawsuit. Id. In the lawsuit, the plaintiffs requested that the 
court deny the incorporation. Id. Alternatively, the plaintiffs asked that the court order a parish-wide 
election to validate or invalidate the incorporation. Id. 
 190 Petition at 4–5, Broome v. Rials, No. C-690041-23 (La. Dist. Ct. Nov. 4, 2019). The plaintiffs 
pointed out that, despite writing in the incorporation petition that St. George would continue to receive 
police services from the parish sheriff, “no one from the proposed new city has made any plausible or 
credible effort to negotiate an agreement with Sheriff Sid Gautreaux for the provision of these services 
or what the cost may be.” Id. at 6. The plaintiffs estimated that policing would cost between eighteen 
and twenty-one million dollars, not four million dollars as the incorporators had budgeted. Id. at 7. If 
the incorporators miscalculated or misrepresented the cost of police services, that would increase the 
budgeted expenditures for the municipality. See COMM. FOR THE INCORPORATION OF ST. GEORGE, 
LLC, CRI FINAL REPORT: CITY OF ST. GEORGE 4, Exhibit 1 (2018), http://stgeorgelouisiana.com/wp-
content/uploads/2020/05/CRI-Final-Report-City-of-St.-George-1.3.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WS9-
PGE9] (presuming that St. George residents would continue to receive police services from the East 
Baton Rouge Parish through a separate tax district, and otherwise accounting for only four million in 
supplementary police services in the proposed budget). In the proposal, the incorporators estimated 
the total budgeted expenditures for St. George at $33,911,000. Id. at 4. 
 191 Petition, supra note 190, at 5–6. 
 192 Id. at 8–9. The Parish Plan of Government specified that, aside from the municipalities of 
Zachary, Baker, and Central, “[n]o additional city, town or village shall be incorporated in East Baton 
Rouge Parish.” Id. (citing THE PLAN OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 174, § 1.05). The defendants re-
sponded that, in 1984, a state court declared the Plan of Government unconstitutional and unenforcea-
ble. Exceptions of No Cause of Action and No Right of Action and Alternative Exceptions of Improp-
er Cumulation of Actions and Failure to Join Parties Needed for Just Adjudication at 1, Broome, No. 
C-690041-23 (La. Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2019) [hereinafter Exceptions of No Cause of Action] (citing De-
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nicipality would require an amendment, which could be accomplished only 
through a parish-wide vote.193 Lastly, the plaintiffs alleged that, in changing 
the map between the first and second attempts, the incorporators had intention-
ally removed people of color from the city in order to dilute the voting power of 
voters of color and decrease minority representation in St. George.194 Conse-
quently, the plaintiffs requested that the district court either deny the incorpora-
tion or order a parish-wide election to amend the City-Parish Plan of Govern-
ment.195 
In their response brief, the incorporation organizers claimed that the 
plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action to contest the election outcome, and 
argued that an appellate court had held that the Plan of Government’s morato-
rium on incorporations was unenforceable.196 The defendants did not address 
the plaintiffs’ allegations of racially discriminatory intent.197 The district court 
has not yet scheduled the first hearing in the case.198 
The Mayor-President has considered challenging the incorporation in fed-
eral court, arguing that the incorporation process violated residents’ Fourteenth 
Amendment due process rights.199 In the meantime, pending these legal con-
tests, St. George is not legally a city.200 If the plaintiffs fail in their legal chal-
lenges, St. George will become the fifth largest city in Louisiana.201 
                                                                                                                           
vall v. Starns, 2006-2155 (La. App. 1 Cir. 03/21/07), 960 So. 2d 75, 83, writ denied, 2007-1224 (La. 
06/22/2007), 959 So. 2d 513). 
 193 Petition, supra note 190, at 9. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. at 11. 
 196 Exceptions of No Cause of Action, supra note 192, at 1; Memorandum in Support of Excep-
tions of No Cause of Action and No Right of Action and Alternative Exceptions of Improper Cumula-
tion of Actions and Failure to Join Parties Needed for Just Adjudication at 2, Broome, No. C-690041-
23 (La. Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2019) [hereinafter Memorandum in Support]. The defendants also claimed 
that the plaintiffs failed to join necessary parties, including the Secretary of State. Memorandum in 
Support, supra, at 12. 
 197 See generally Memorandum in Support, supra note 196 (lacking any mention of racial de-
mographics of the proposed municipality). 
 198 Stephanie Riegel, The St. George Saga Will Continue, GREATER BATON ROUGE BUS. REP. (Jan. 
7, 2020), https://www.businessreport.com/business/st-george-lawsuit-baton-rouge [https://perma.cc/
NSJ7-CBWG]. 
 199 Riegel, supra note 173. Lawyers on both sides predict that the case will last at least two to 
three years. Id. 
 200 LA. STAT. ANN. § 33:3(D) (2020). The Louisiana governor will not name any city officials 
until after the issue has been resolved in court. Id. § 33:6. 
 201 Rojas, supra note 2. 
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B. California 
The California state government exercises more oversight over the mu-
nicipal incorporation process than its Louisianan counterpart.202 Even aside 
from the high financial cost of incorporation in California, incorporation is 
challenging in California because incorporators must persuade their county’s 
local agency formation commission (LAFCO) to approve of the incorpora-
tion.203 Under the Cortese-Knox-Hertzberg Local Reorganization Act of 2000, 
organizers must collect signatures, conduct a fiscal analysis, submit a petition, 
persuade the LAFCO, and then submit the proposal to the voters in an elec-
tion.204 
First, if the proposed municipality has over one hundred thousand resi-
dents and is situated in a county with over four million residents, the organiz-
ers must publish their intention in a newspaper to make others aware of their 
plan.205 Then, they can begin collecting signatures.206 They must obtain signa-
tures of at least twenty-five percent of the registered voters of the proposed 
                                                                                                                           
 202 Compare LA. STAT. ANN. § 33:1–3 (granting a limited role to the governor, who checks for 
procedural compliance), with CAL. GOV’T CODE § 56720 (West 2020) (forbidding a local agency 
formation commission (LAFCO) from approving an incorporation proposal unless certain require-
ments have been met). 
 203 Ihn, supra note 51, at 78, 79. 
 204 Id. Before 1963, the California state government exercised very little state administrative 
oversight over the municipal incorporation process. Dolores Tremewan Martin & Richard E. Wagner, 
The Institutional Framework for Municipal Incorporation: An Economic Analysis of Local Agency 
Formation Commissions in California, 21 J.L. & ECON. 409, 412 (1978). Local Boundary Commis-
sions would verify incorporation petitions, unless they did not meet the statutory requirements, and 
then the organizers would collect sufficient signatures to get the incorporation on their next election’s 
ballot. Ihn, supra note 51, at 78. In effect, organizers could freely incorporate territory. Tremewan & 
Wagner, supra, at 412. Then, the California State Legislature passed the Knox-Nisbet Act in 1963 to 
“discourage[e] urban sprawl, contribut[e] to the logical and reasonable development of local govern-
ments, shap[e] the development of local agencies so as to provide for the future need of the county 
and the communities within the county, and determin[e] the maximum service area and service ca-
pacities of existing governmental agencies.” Id. at 412, 413. In 2000, the California State Legislature 
tinkered with its incorporation regime by enacting the Cortese-Knox-Hertzberg Local Reorganization 
Act, which was most recently updated in 2009. Ihn, supra note 51, at 78. 
 205 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 56760. The notice is at most five hundred words and explains why the 
organizers are working toward incorporation. Id. Between one and three “chief petitioners” must sign 
the notice of intent. Id. California statute formerly defined “chief petitioners” as “any persons desig-
nated in a petition for the purpose of receiving any notice authorized or required to be given to those 
persons.” Act of Sept. 9, 1985, ch. 541, § 3, 1985 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 56022 (repealed 2000). The 
California Legislature did not replace the repealed statute. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 56010–56081 
(2020) (lacking a definition for “chief petitioners”). Additionally, the newspaper must have a “general 
circulation within each affected county, affected city, or affected district.” Id. § 56153. 
 206 Ihn, supra note 51, at 79. The Governor’s Office of Planning and Research suggests that or-
ganizers conduct an initial fiscal analysis (IFA) before embarking on the incorporation process, 
though the IFA is not a requirement under law. Id. at 78. When organizers tried to incorporate East 
Los Angeles in 2007, the IFA cost twenty-five thousand dollars. Id. (citing Susannah Rosenblatt, East 
L.A. Ready, Financially, for Independence, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2007), http://articles.latimes.com/
2007/oct/17/ local/me-eastla17 [https://perma.cc/AA52-5WU3]). 
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municipality or of the landowners of the area in the proposed municipality.207 
Next, the organizers must submit the signatures to their county’s LAFCO, 
which verifies the signatures within thirty days.208 After completing the signa-
ture-collecting step, the organizers draft and submit an incorporation peti-
tion.209 The petition must contain an explanation of the proposed municipality, 
a boundary map, and the names of one to three organizers.210 Then, the organ-
izers must commission a Comprehensive Fiscal Analysis (CFA).211 
The executive director of the LAFCO reviews the petition and CFA and, 
at least five days prior to the hearing on the incorporation, issues a report with 
recommendations for the LAFCO.212 Then, the LAFCO convenes a hearing.213 
The statute does not restrict who can offer comments at the hearing, either in 
favor of or against the incorporation.214 LAFCOs have a long list of factors 
that they must consider as they review a proposal for incorporation, including 
population density, proximity to other municipalities, the need for public ser-
vices and cost of delivery, the impact of changing the public services on neigh-
boring areas, the socio-economic impact on the county, the region’s transporta-
tion plan, water plans, and how the incorporation would affect affordable hous-
ing in the county.215 The statute makes clear that the LAFCO also can consider 
                                                                                                                           
 207 Id. at 79 (citing CAL. GOV’T CODE § 56764). The landowners collectively must own at least 
25% of the assessed property value in the proposed municipality. Id. (citing CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§ 56764). 
 208 Id. (citing CAL. GOV’T CODE § 56706). The LAFCO prepares a certificate of sufficiency. CAL. 
GOV’T CODE § 56706. If the petition does not have enough signatures, the LAFCO will immediately 
notify the organizers. Id. § 56706(b)(1). Then, the organizers will have fifteen days to turn in more 
signatures, and the LAFCO will respond again within ten days. Id. § 56706(b)(2), (c). 
 209 Ihn, supra note 51, at 79. 
 210 Id. The petition also includes a legal description of the proposed municipality. Id. 
 211 Id. The CFA reflects the estimated costs of public services and facilities. Id. 
 212 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 56665. The report goes out to the organizers and every local agency and 
city that would be impacted by the incorporation. Id. 
 213 Id. § 56666. 
 214 See id. § 56666(b) (“[T]he commission shall hear and receive any oral or written protests, 
objections, or evidence that shall be made, presented, or filed . . . .” (emphasis added)). The LAFCO 
may continue the hearing, but not past seventy days from the original notice of the hearing. Id. 
§ 56666(a). 
 215 Id. § 56668. The statute lists other factors, too, including: 
[L]and use; assessed valuation . . . the likelihood of significant growth in the area, and 
in adjacent incorporated and unincorporated areas, during the next 10 years . . . [t]he 
conformity of both the proposal and its anticipated effects with both the adopted com-
mission policies on providing planned, orderly, efficient patterns of urban development 
. . . [t]he effect of the proposal on maintaining the physical and economic integrity of 
agricultural lands . . . [t]he definiteness and certainty of the boundaries of the territory, 
the nonconformance of proposed boundaries with lines of assessment or ownership, the 
creation of islands or corridors of unincorporated territory, and other similar matters af-
fecting the proposed boundaries . . . [t]he proposal’s consistency with . . . county gen-
eral and specific plans . . . [t]he sphere of influence of any local agency that may be ap-
plicable to the proposal being reviewed . . . [t]he comments of any affected local agency 
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factors outside of the seventeen enumerated.216 The LAFCO has the option to 
consider the region’s goals, as identified by its elected officials.217 The LAFCO 
then approves or rejects the incorporation proposal.218 If it approves the pro-
posal, the LAFCO schedules an election.219 Residents of the proposed munici-
pality also may run for the city council of the proposed municipality.220 Only 
residents of the proposed municipality may vote in the election.221 
The voting arrangement in California—permitting only residents of the 
proposed municipality to vote—has not gone uncontested.222 In 1986, organiz-
ers in an unincorporated area of Sacramento County, known as Citrus Heights, 
collected sufficient signatures to hold an incorporation vote.223 Only residents 
of the proposed municipality could vote, which did not settle well with parties 
in the surrounding county who would have been negatively affected by the 
incorporation.224 The Sacramento County Board of Supervisors and co-parties 
sued, alleging that the incorporation election statute, codified at that time as 
                                                                                                                           
or other public agency . . . [t]he ability of the newly formed or receiving entity to pro-
vide the services that are the subject of the application to the area, including the suffi-
ciency of revenues for those services following the proposed boundary change . . . [a]ny 
information or comments from the landowner or landowners, voters, or residents of the 
affected territory . . . [a]ny information relating to existing land use designations . . . 
[t]he extent to which the proposal will promote environmental justice . . . [and] 
[i]nformation contained in a local hazard mitigation plan . . . . 
Id. 
 216 See id. (stating that the LAFCO may, but is not “limited to,” reviewing the seventeen factors 
listed in the statute). 
 217 Id. § 56668.5. 
 218 Ihn, supra note 51, at 79. 
 219 Id. The incorporation proposal will be on the ballot at the next scheduled general election, as 
long as at least eighty-eight days have passed since the LAFCO approved of the proposal. Id. The 
Supreme Court of California referred to this last step as “like that of the masons who place a keystone 
at the apex of a high and intricate arch.” Bd. of Supervisors v. Local Agency Formation Comm’n 
(LAFCO), 838 P.2d 1198, 1203 (Cal. 1992). Although the vote is essential, by that point the “proposal 
will already have undergone a labyrinthine process containing elaborate safeguards designed to pro-
tect the political and economic interests of affected local governments, residents, and landowners.” Id. 
 220 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 56724; Ihn, supra note 51, at 79. 
 221 LAFCO, 838 P.2d at 1200. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. The LAFCO approved the resolution only after the organizers had altered the boundaries of 
the proposed municipality to exclude two shopping centers. Id. Otherwise, the county would have lost 
substantial sales tax revenue from the shopping centers. Id. Even after this adjustment, though, the 
plaintiffs calculated that the incorporation of Citrus Heights would reduce the county’s revenues by 
$2.5 million for the initial year. Id. at 1210. The loss would come out to about $36 per resident. See id. 
at 1200 (estimating the population of Citrus Heights at sixty-nine thousand residents). The defendants 
disagreed, contesting that the cost would only be about $5 per unincorporated-area resident. Id. at 
1210. 
 224 Id. at 1200, 1201. 
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section 57103, denied them equal protection under the Fourteen Amend-
ment.225 
Ultimately, the California Supreme Court held that section 57103’s limita-
tion on voting eligibility did not violate the Equal Protection provision of the 
U.S. Constitution, nor California’s Constitution.226 The decision rested on two 
theories.227 First, the state had the power to organize its political subdivisions 
however it saw fit.228 Second, the residents living inside the proposed munici-
pality had a greater degree of interest in the vote than those living outside of 
the proposed municipality’s boundaries.229 Because of the residents’ distinct 
interests, the classification would be struck down only under a facial challenge 
if it lacked a rational basis.230 The court decided that the statute did have a ra-
tional basis because the Legislature had a legitimate purpose in enacting the 
statute: to promote regional growth.231 
Citrus Heights became the first city to incorporate in Sacramento County 
since 1946.232 After Citrus Heights paved the way to incorporation in Sacra-
                                                                                                                           
 225 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 57103 (1992); LAFCO, 838 P.2d at 1201 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7); see supra note 122 and accompanying text (explaining the Four-
teenth Amendment). The two co-parties were the Sacramento County Deputy Sheriffs’ Association 
and the Sacramentans to Save Our Services. LAFCO, 838 P.2d at 1201. About forty local organiza-
tions were members of the Sacramentans to Save our Services, working in “social and community 
service, labor, law enforcement, and business organizations, many of which receive[d] county funds.” 
Id. The appellate court held that the statute was unconstitutional as applied, but the California Su-
preme Court later reversed the decision. Id. at 1200. 
 226 LAFCO, 838 P.2d at 1211. Section 57103 did not violate the federal or state Equal Protection 
Clause on its face, nor as applied to the Citrus Heights incorporation. Id. 
 227 Id. at 1209. 
 228 Id. 
 229 Id. The California Supreme Court distinguished the Citrus Heights incorporation from a disso-
lution vote in an earlier case, based on the reasoning that dissolution “has a substantial effect upon the 
residents of both territories involved.” Id. at 1208 (citing Fullerton Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. 
State Bd. of Educ., 654 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1982)). 
 230 Id. at 1209–10. When a court applies rational basis review, the state “has no obligation to 
produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification.” Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 
320 (1993). Rather, the court will uphold the classification as long as “there is a rational relationship 
between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.” Id. The California 
Supreme Court declined to apply strict scrutiny to the as-applied challenge as well, deferring to the 
state legislature’s decision to address specifically Sacramento County’s “unique circumstances” by 
giving it its own separate chapter in the Government Code. LAFCO, 838 P.2d at 1210. Sacramento 
County is unique because of the City of Sacramento’s large population, “which affects its role in the 
growth and development of urban areas.” Act of Sept. 19, 1991, ch. 439, § 2, 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. 
ch. 439 (West). The “unique facts and circumstances” apply only to Sacramento County. Id. 
 231 LAFCO, 838 P.2d at 1211. The court was hesitant “[t]o frustrate the endeavor of individuals to 
fix the unit of their local governance . . . .” Id. (quoting Curtis v. Bd. of Supervisors, 501 P.2d 537, 
554 (Cal. 1972)). It ultimately reasoned that permitting “relatively disinterested majorities [to] veto 
incorporations” would undermine the state’s structured incorporation process. Id. at 1211. 
 232 Leora Waldner & Russell M. Smith, The Great Defection: How New City Clusters Form to 
Escape County Governance, 39 PUB. ADMIN. Q. 170, 192 (2015). Citrus Heights then had to compen-
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mento County, other communities followed its lead.233 As of January 1, 1990, 
only 39.3% of Sacramento County residents lived in municipalities as opposed 
to unincorporated territory.234 By December 31, 2009, however, the percentage 
had increased to 60.9%.235 
C. Arizona 
Whereas Louisiana and California’s incorporation processes leave much 
to be desired, Arizona strikes a balance between local, regional, and state inter-
ests in its incorporation regime.236 With respect to urban areas, the Arizona 
state government prioritizes the consolidation of local governments.237 Since 
1961, Arizona has had a two-tiered system of incorporation.238 When residents 
of a territory not located in an urbanized area seek incorporation, they need to 
either petition collectively for incorporation or vote amongst themselves.239 
Residents of territorities within urbanized areas, who want to incorporate, 
however, need the consent of the neighboring city or town.240 
Section 9-101 of the Arizona Revised Statutes is the default incorporation 
procedure for any territory that is not in an urbanized area.241 To be eligible for 
incorporation, a territory must have certain characteristics.242 For example, the 
proposed municipality must constitute a “community,” in that the residents live 
close to one another, have similar interests in terms of the public services their 
government would provide, and come into contact with one another for a va-
                                                                                                                           
sate Sacramento County for lost revenues under a different provision of the Local Government Reor-
ganization Act. Id. Citrus Heights paid $5.6 million annually to the county. Id. 
 233 Id. Both Rancho Cordova and Elk Grove incorporated after Citrus Heights. Id. After Rancho 
Cordovo incorporated, City Councilwoman Linda Budge said that Citrus Heights was the inspiration 
for their own incorporation. Id. at 193. 
 234 Id. at 177, 195. 
 235 Id. 
 236 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-101.01(C) (2020) (prohibiting any “territory within an urban-
ized area” from incorporating without consent of the bordering incorporated city or town); supra notes 
158–235 and accompanying text (describing the municipal incorporation regimes of Louisiana and 
California). Section 9-101.01 defines urbanized area as “all territory within six miles of an incorpo-
rated city or town . . . having a population of five thousand or more persons, and all territory within 
three miles of any incorporated city or town . . . having a population of less than five thousand per-
sons.” § 9-101.01(A). 
 237 See City of Tucson v. Pima Cnty., 19 P.3d 650, 660 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (“The very purpose 
of section 9-101.01 is to protect cities and towns from problems that may flow from the existence of 
many separate governmental entities in a limited geographical area.” (quoting City of Tucson v. 
Woods, 959 P.2d 394, 397 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997))). 
 238 Id. at 653. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. at 653–54 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-101.01). 
 241 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-101; Pima Cnty., 19 P.3d at 653. 
 242 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-101. 
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riety of reasons.243 The area to be incorporated must be “urban” in nature and 
cannot have a substantial amount of rural, farming, or uninhabited land.244 The 
board of supervisors will not sanction an incorporation if the area remaining 
unincorporated, after the fact, becomes entirely surrounded by incorporated 
territory.245 Unless the territory is within ten miles of a national park or monu-
ment, the minimum population size for incorporation in Arizona is fifteen hun-
dred.246 If the territory is within ten miles of a national park or monument, the 
minimum is five hundred.247 
Petitioners first file an incorporation petition with the county recorder or 
county elections department.248 The petitioners then have 180 days to collect 
signatures in one of two ways.249 One option is to gather signatures of two-
thirds of the population within the proposed boundaries, and submit the signa-
tures to the board of supervisors to sign off on the incorporation.250 Alterna-
tively, the petitioners can gather signatures of ten percent of the population 
within the boundaries to call for an election for incorporation.251 If a majority 
vote in favor of the incorporation, it passes.252 Under either process, the resi-
dents of the proposed municipality have control over the outcome unless a 
neighboring municipality interferes.253 A neighboring municipality, for exam-
ple, can pass an annexation ordinance to annex part of the area in question.254 
In that case, the board of supervisors would be required to exclude that area 
from the new municipality.255 Moreover, if the proposed municipality subse-
                                                                                                                           
 243 Id. § 9-101(E). Specifically, in a community, the residents live “in more or less proximity 
having common interests in such services as public health, public protection, fire protection and water 
that bind together the people of the area, and where the people are acquainted and mingle in business, 
social, educational, and recreational activities.” Id. § 9-101(J). 
 244 Id. § 9-101(F). 
 245 Id. § 9-101(G). A proposed municipality must include all interior county roads, unless exempt 
from that requirement by the board of supervisors. Id. 
 246 Id. § 9-101(A), (B). 
 247 Id. The legislature added the exception for areas near national parks because the community of 
Tusayan, sitting approximately one mile from a Grand Canyon entrance, wanted to incorporate and 
had fewer than five hundred residents. Ariz. S. Fact Sheet for S.B. 1122, 1st Reg. Sess. (2003). 
 248 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-101(C). The petitioners must state their purpose “clearly and con-
cisely,” and sign and verify the petition. Id. 
 249 Id. 
 250 Id. § 9-101(A). If the proposed municipality is in more than one county, two-thirds of the 
residents in the area in each county must sign the petition. Id. § 9-131(A). 
 251 Id. § 9-131(B). If the proposed municipality is in more than one county, then 10% of the resi-
dents of the area in each county must sign the petition. Id. The board or boards of supervisors must 
meet to call the election within sixty days of the petitioners submitting the signatures, and the election 
must take place within 180 days. Id. §§ 9-101(B), 9-131(B). If the residents have already tried to in-
corporate the territory, then the board must wait at least a year before holding a new election. § 9-
101(B). 
 252 Id. 
 253 Id. § 9-101. 
 254 Id. § 9-101(H). 
 255 Id. 
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quently fails to meet the incorporation requirements because it has lost part of 
its proposed territory to annexation, the board of supervisors must reject the 
incorporation petition.256 
For territory that is not within an urbanized area, the process resembles 
that of California, but without the condition of a hearing.257 When the territory 
at issue is in an urbanized area, however, the story is different.258 Pursuant to 
section 9-101.01(C) of the Arizona Revised Statutes, the board of supervisors 
may not approve an incorporation petition in an urbanized area unless either: 
(1) the existing municipality that makes the area urban adopts a resolution ap-
proving the proposal; or (2) the proposed municipality requests annexation into 
the existing municipality, and the existing municipality has not previously an-
nexed it within 120 days.259 
The state’s restrictions on urbanized area incorporation have withstood 
judicial scrutiny at both the state and federal level.260 In 1997, residents of an 
unincorporated area in Pima County, Arizona, known as Tortolita, petitioned 
for incorporation.261 Tortolita, however, was within six miles of three cities and 
                                                                                                                           
 256 Id. 
 257 See id. § 9-101(A), (B) (restricting the incorporation vote to residents of the proposed munici-
pality); Bd. of Supervisors v. Local Agency Formation Comm’n (LAFCO), 838 P.2d 1198, 1200 (Cal. 
1992) (explaining that, in California, only the residents in the proposed municipality may vote in an 
incorporation election). 
 258 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-101.01 (setting different incorporation requirements for terri-
tories in urbanized areas). The statute defines urbanized area as “all territory within six miles of an 
incorporated city or town . . . having a population of five thousand or more persons, and all territory 
within three miles of any incorporated city or town . . . having a population of less than five thousand 
persons.” Id. § 9-101.01(A). 
 259 Id. § 9-101.01(C). The existing municipality must adopt a resolution to approve the proposed 
municipality. Id. § 9-101.01(C)(1). The proposed municipality would then file the resolution with its 
petition for incorporation. Id. Alternatively, an existing municipality could annex the area in the pro-
posed municipality by passing an ordinance. Id. § 9-101.01(C)(2). If the existing municipality has not 
acted on the annexation request, then the proposed municipality would submit an affidavit to that 
effect. Id. The statute carves out some exceptions to this process. Id. § 9-101.01(E)–(H). For example, 
the board of supervisors can approve an incorporation petition without the existing municipality’s 
consent if the proposed municipality fits three criteria. Id. § 9-101.01(E). The municipality must: (1) 
have more than fifteen thousand residents; (2) exist in a county where between 60-65% of the popula-
tion lives in an existing municipality; and (3) “ha[ve] a governing board, including a planned commu-
nity board of directors or a special district board.” Id. In a similar vein, the board of supervisors may 
approve a petition for incorporation without the proposed municipality haven taken those two steps, 
even if the existing municipality disapproves, if the proposed municipality has more than fifteen thou-
sand residents and has more residents than “the city or town that causes the urbanized area to exist.” 
Id. § 9-101.01(F). 
 260 Green v. City of Tucson, 340 F.3d 891, 893 (9th Cir. 2003); City of Tucson v. Pima Cnty., 19 
P.3d 650, 653 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001). 
 261 Green, 340 F.3d at 893. Residents in Casas Adobes petitioned for incorporation, as well. Pima 
Cnty., 19 P.3d at 654. Pima County runs along the southern border of Arizona, flanked by Yuma 
County to the west and Cochise County to the east. See County Map of Arizona, GOOGLE MAPS, 
https://www.google.com/maps/search/County+Map+of+Arizona/@34.0858901,-116.435679,6z/
data=!3m1!4b1 [https://perma.cc/8QT7-GX2A] (search “county map of Arizona”). The City of Tuc-
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towns—the City of Tucson and the towns of Marana and Oro Valley.262 All 
three municipalities opposed Tortolita’s incorporation.263 Because Tortolita 
lacked the required consent for incorporation in an urbanized area, it could not 
incorporate.264 Tortolita then challenged the constitutionality of section 9-
101.01 in state court.265 Specifically, Tortolita and its co-plaintiffs argued that 
the consent requirement of section 9-101.01(B) burdened the Tortolita resi-
dents’ right to vote, thereby violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.266 The Arizona Court of Appeals, however, held that sec-
tion 9-101.01 did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.267 
Concurrent with the state claim, organizers of the Tortolita incorporation 
also filed a section 1983 civil action for deprivation of rights in federal district 
                                                                                                                           
son is toward the northeastern part of the county. Map of Pima County, Arizona, GOOGLE MAPS, 
https://www.google.com/maps/place/Pima+County,+AZ/@31.9651782,-113.0147836,8z/data=!3m1
!4b1!4m5!3m4!1s0x86d5e18f3072c27b:0x97100bf0c82023d8!8m2!3d32.057499!4d-111.6660725 
[https://perma.cc/TXJ2-2VDM] (search “Pima County, AZ”). The county is named after the Pima 
Native Americans. PIMA PROSPERS COMPREHENSIVE PLAN INITIATIVE, APPENDIX A: BACKGROUND 
& CURRENT CONDITIONS A1.3, https://webcms.pima.gov/UserFiles/Servers/Server_6/File/Government/
Pima%20Prospers/Official%20Plan/Appedix%20A%20Backgound%20and%20Current%20Condtions.
pdf [https://perma.cc/9H4K-L94N]. Today, much of the Tohono O’odham reservation is in Pima 
County, along with the Pascua Yaqui Tribe, both of which are sovereign nations. Id. The Tohono 
O’odham reservation is the third largest reservation in the United States. Id. 
 262 Green, 340 F.3d at 893. 
 263 Id. In 1997, the Arizona Legislature passed a statute to suspend the consent requirement be-
tween July 21, 1997 and July 15, 1999 for areas within a county that have populations between five 
hundred thousand and one million residents. 1997 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 204, § 2; Green, 340 F.3d at 
894; Pima Cnty., 19 P.3d at 654. Only Pima County qualified for the exception. Green, 340 F.3d at 
894 n.4. The City of Tucson challenged the 1997 statute in superior court and lost. Id. at 894–95. The 
board of supervisors, relying on the 1997 law, then approved the Tortolita incorporation and an-
nounced an upcoming election for the Casas Adobes election. Pima Cnty., 19 P.3d at 654. The Arizo-
na Court of Appeals, meanwhile, struck down the 1997 law as a special or local law in violation of the 
Arizona Constitution, consequently voiding the Tortolita and Casas Adobes incorporation processes. 
Id. (citing City of Tucson v. Woods, 959 P.2d 394 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997)). Pima County, joined by the 
board of supervisors, “the Committee to Incorporate [the Village of Casas Adobes] . . . and the Com-
mittee to Incorporate the Town of Tortolita,” challenged section 9-101.01. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 9-101.01; Pima Cnty., 19 P.3d at 654. 
 264 Pima Cnty., 19 P.3d at 654. 
 265 Id. The superior court upheld section 9-101.01(B)(1), rejecting Tortolita’s claim that the stat-
ute violated “equal protection, procedural or substantive due process, the ‘right to self-determination’ 
or any of the rights enshrined by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Id. at 655. 
Moreover, the court said that the statute had “a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest 
against the Balkanization of its counties.” Id. Balkanization is the breaking up of a region “into small-
er and often hostile units.” Balkanize, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/balkanization [https://perma.cc/N4EL-6JV5]. 
 266 Pima Cnty., 19 P.3d at 656. 
 267 Id. at 660. Because the statute treated all residents within the proposed municipality equally, it 
did not burden the residents’ right to vote, and thus the court chose to apply a rational basis level of 
scrutiny. Id. at 659. Furthermore, given that the policy of requiring an existing municipality’s consent 
for proposed municipalities in urbanized areas had “a rational relationship to a legitimate state inter-
est,” and promoted “orderly development and efficient municipal administration,” the statute with-
stood rational basis review. Id. at 660 (quoting Woods, 959 P.2d at 401). 
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court, similarly alleging that section 9-101.01 violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.268 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit likewise held that section 
9-101.01 did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it survived ra-
tional basis scrutiny.269 
Despite remaining unincorporated, Tortolita continues to experience 
steady population growth.270 In 2000, 89,597 people lived in Tortolita.271 By 
2010, the population had risen to 108,154.272 Like its unincorporated neighbor, 
the City of Tucson experienced population growth from 405,390 residents in 
1990 to 520,116 in 2010.273 The demographics have not changed significantly 
in either Tortolita or Tucson.274 The housing market continues to improve in 
both Tortolita and Tucson.275 The median income also rose in both Tortolita 
and Tucson between 1990 and 2010.276 
                                                                                                                           
 268 Green, 340 F.3d at 895 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code 
provides: 
Every person who, under color of any [law] subjects, or causes to be subjected, any cit-
izen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 
be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 269 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Green, 340 F.3d at 903. The Ninth Circuit applied rational basis scrutiny 
because even though “[s]ection 9-101.01 undoubtedly discriminates . . . it discriminates between dif-
ferent electoral units based on their proximity to existing municipalities, rather than between voters in 
any single electoral unit.” Green, 340 F.3d at 900. Under Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, the state of 
Arizona had control over its municipalities, and it properly delegated some of that authority to urban 
municipalities through the consent provision in section 9-101.01. Id. at 900–01 (citing Hunter v. City 
of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907)). Rational basis, therefore, was the appropriate standard of 
review for the statute. Id. at 902. Moreover, the statute “easily passe[d] constitutional muster” under 
rational basis scrutiny. Id. at 903. Section 9-101.01 was rationally related to regulating incorporation 
and protecting the interests of other municipalities. Id. The court noted that permitting incorporation 
on the fringe of existing municipalities, without their consent, would lead to “intergovernmental con-
flict over resources and economic development.” Id. (citing Briffault, supra note 28, at 77). 
 270 PIMA PROSPERS COMPREHENSIVE PLAN INITIATIVE, supra note 261, at A2.20. 
 271 Id. 
 272 Id. 
 273 Id. 
 274 Id. at A2.33. In 1990, 86.5% of Tortolita was non-Hispanic white. Id. In 2000, the percentage 
rose to 92%, but by 2010 it had decreased to 89.5%. Id. In 1990, 10.6% of the Tortolita population 
was Hispanic. Id. By 2010, that percentage had risen to 17.6%. Id. The percentage of white residents of 
Tucson decreased from 63% in 1990 to 48% in 2010. Id. 
 275 Id. at A2.41. The average house (or dwelling unit) in Tortolita was worth $106,680 in 1990 and 
$289,494 by 2010. Id. The average house (or dwelling unit) in Tucson was worth $66,600 in 1990 and 
$171,200 by 2010. Id. 
 276 Id. at A2.35. The median household income in Tortolita was $41,285 in 1990 and $78,035 in 
2010. Id. The median income in Tucson was $21,748 in 1990 and $37,448 in 2010. Id. As a comparison, 
the median income in Phoenix was $30,797 in 1990 and $42,260 in 2010. CITY OF PHOENIX, PHOENIX 
GROWTH 46 (2013), https://www.phoenix.gov/budgetsite/Documents/2013Sum%20Community%20
Profile%20and%20Trends.pdf [https://perma.cc/JL7T-49WM]. 
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Years after Tortolita’s failed incorporation, much of Pima County, Arizona 
remains unincorporated.277 There are still only five municipalities in Pima 
County.278 Most county residents live in either Tucson or the unincorporated 
suburban areas around Tucson.279 In 2009, thirty-six percent of Pima County’s 
one million residents resided in unincorporated territory.280 The Arizona state 
legislature has therefore succeeded in protecting its urban areas from a prolif-
eration of suburbs that would drain urban resources and development.281 This 
is a stark contrast to the California regime, and even more so with respect to 
Louisiana’s regime.282 
III. THE NEED FOR FACTORING REGIONAL IMPACT INTO A STATE 
MUNICIPAL INCORPORATION REGIME 
This Part explains what is at stake when states decide how to organize 
their cities and towns.283 How a state drafts its incorporation statutes affects 
where municipalities can emerge, who lives within them, and what resources 
are accessible to those municipalities.284 Because states have so few tools at 
their disposal to remedy the effects of municipal proliferation, they should en-
sure that their municipal incorporation statutes only permit incorporations that 
do not restrict urban resources.285 Section A of this Part describes the adverse 
                                                                                                                           
 277 Joe Pangburn, Unincorporated Pima County Communities Leave Millions of Shared Revenue 
on the Table, INSIDE TUCSON BUS. (Sept. 11, 2009), https://www.insidetucsonbusiness.com/news/
unincorporated-pima-county-communities-leave-millions-of-shared-revenue-on/article_4218a01a-
2cda-56d3-931d-0f5ee677375a.html [https://perma.cc/T3K6-AHJS]. 
 278 PIMA PROSPERS COMPREHENSIVE PLAN INITIATIVE, supra note 261, at A2.12. The municipal-
ities are: the town of Marana, the town of Sahuarita, the City of Tucson, the City of South Tucson, and 
the town of Oro Valley. Id. 
 279 Id. at A1.3. Distinct from the eastern party of Pima County, “[t]he rest of the county is sparse-
ly populated and primarily rural in character.” Id. at A2.11. Only 13.6% of the county is private land, 
or 1,250 square miles. Id. at A1.4. The rest of the county is either owned by Pima County, the State of 
Arizona, the U.S. Bureau of Land Management, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the U.S. Military, 
or the U.S. Park Service, or comprises Native American reservation land. Id. at A2.59. 
 280 Pangburn, supra note 277. 
 281 Green v. City of Tucson, 340 F.3d 891, 903 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 282 See Charles Lussier, Why Forming a New City Like St. George Might Be Easier Than Starting 
a New School System, THE ADVOCATE (Aug. 24, 2019), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/
news/education/article_8242116e-c682-11e9-8ab1-27dbb391e67c.html [https://perma.cc/L5V3-ZP6X] 
(stating that three communities seceded from East Baton Rouge Parish before St. George voted to do 
the same); Incorporated Cities, CNTY. OF L.A., https://lacounty.gov/government/about-la-county/
incorporated-cities/ [https://perma.cc/ZM3H-NLDQ] (“The first of the County’s 88 cities was incor-
porated in 1850, the last in 1991.”). 
 283 See infra notes 288–330 and accompanying text (describing how exclusionary municipal in-
corporations negatively affect their neighboring communities and what states can do to prevent them 
from happening). 
 284 See infra notes 288–306 and accompanying text. 
 285 See infra notes 307–330 and accompanying text. 
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impacts, particularly on urban areas, of municipal proliferation.286 Section B 
explains why incorporation regime reform is a promising starting point, espe-
cially when implemented with other regional and redistributing policies.287 
A. The Adverse Consequences of Municipal Proliferation 
There are clear incentives to incorporation: once a municipality incorpo-
rates, its residents have the autonomy to elect local government officials who 
will, in turn, enact public policies and operate government services that the 
residents desire.288 But every municipal incorporation affects the surrounding 
communities and has the capacity to cause or to exacerbate regional racial seg-
regation.289 
Municipal incorporations create externalities, or negative economic con-
sequences, for their regions by removing their property tax base from the pre-
existing jurisdiction and instituting exclusionary zoning codes.290 Municipali-
ties and counties raise most of their revenue through local taxes, primarily 
property taxes.291 They can provide public services only when they raise suffi-
cient revenues through taxes to do so.292 When higher-income individuals se-
cede from a county and incorporate, the residents of the county lose taxes that 
would be spent on public services.293 Particularly in metropolitan areas, munic-
ipal incorporation builds a tax wall between neighbors who previously re-
ceived goods and services from the same government entity.294 In other words, 
new municipal boundaries make it possible for high-income residents to pre-
serve their tax revenue pool for themselves and prevent redistribution of their 
                                                                                                                           
 286 See infra notes 288–306 and accompanying text. 
 287 See infra notes 307–330 and accompanying text. 
 288 Briffault, supra note 51, at 1115. Municipalities derive their autonomy from state home rule 
statutes. GERALD E. FRUG ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 198 (6th ed. 
2015). 
 289 See Agustin Leon-Moreta, Municipal Incorporation in the United States, 52 URB. STUD. 3160, 
3162 (2015) (“History suggests that urban heterogeneity has been a central factor in initiatives for 
municipal incorporation in America.” (citations omitted)); see also id. (explaining that individuals 
incorporate new municipalities to “circumvent [regional] redistribution since municipalities can redis-
tribute resident income through tax-and-service policies”). Income gaps are often correlated with 
racial segregation in urban areas, so “municipal incorporations might also reflect a collective choice to 
circumvent both ethnic and income heterogeneity.” Id. 
 290 BURNS, supra note 51, at 81; Rice et al., supra note 53, at 140. An externality is “[a] conse-
quence or side effect of one’s economic [or political] activity, causing another to benefit without pay-
ing or to suffer without compensation.” Externality, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 291 Briffault, supra note 51, at 1129. 
 292 Id. at 1134. 
 293 See Tyson, supra note 18, at 669 (“Municipal fragmentation operates to limit the scope of wealth 
redistribution within the broader metropolis. Municipal boundaries have functioned to reinforce existing 
racial and class-based systems of privilege and disadvantage . . . .”). 
 294 Laurie Reynolds, Local Governments and Regional Governance, 39 URB. LAW. 483, 493 
(2007); Tyson, supra note 18, at 669. 
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property tax dollars to urban public services, such as schools and transporta-
tion.295 As a result, incorporation causes the imbalanced allocation of govern-
ment benefits and services, with higher property value municipalities having 
better funded public schools than their neighboring urban communities.296 
Exclusionary incorporation also segments and aggravates regional racial 
segregation, as illustrated by the St. George, Louisiana case study.297 Federal 
Civil Rights legislation precludes gerrymandering in congressional districts, 
but does not prevent incorporation along racial lines.298 That is up to the states, 
who are the managers of their municipalities.299 The implications are not theo-
retical.300 American history has shown that municipal boundaries more fre-
quently divide populations by race than do neighborhood boundaries.301 And 
the segregation amplifies once a white enclave has successfully incorpo-
rated.302 As soon as wealthy enclaves incorporate into a municipality, they can 
use the zoning power to sustain the municipality’s income composition.303 
Race and income are often correlated, such that people of color are dispropor-
tionately excluded from these communities.304 Very quickly, a county that once 
had a consolidated government structure and a unified school district, such as 
East Baton Rouge Parish, can turn into an urban school district with a majority 
of students of color, surrounded by small school districts with primarily white 
                                                                                                                           
 295 See Reynolds, supra note 294, at 493 (“[L]ocal government boundaries have improperly al-
lowed some privileged local government units to avoid participation in regional redistribution of 
wealth and opportunities.”); see also Bruce Katz & Elizabeth Kneebone, On Ferguson, Fragmenta-
tion, and Fiscal Disparities, BROOKINGS (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/
2015/04/02/on-ferguson-fragmentation-and-fiscal-disparities/ [https://perma.cc/L34Q-D5D8] (ex-
plaining that Ferguson, Missouri, with a population of twenty-one thousand, is only one of ninety-one 
local governments in Missouri, each needing to raise its own revenue to pay for municipal services). 
Because of municipal fragmentation, communities like Ferguson, with declining employment oppor-
tunities and population, rely on traffic fines and court fees to supplement dwindling property tax ba-
ses. Katz & Kneebone, supra. 
 296 Tyson, supra note 18, at 669; see supra notes 173–177 and accompanying text (describing the 
demographic differences between St. George, Louisiana and the broader East Baton Rouge Parish). 
 297 Tyson, supra note 18, at 669; see supra notes 173–200 and accompanying text (describing the 
racial implications of St. George’s incorporation movement). This phenomenon is known as “destruc-
tive localism.” Wilson, supra note 17, at 147. Destructive localism is “the use of decentralization to 
foster the tenets of localism for one group, but in a way that divorces that group from serious social 
problems and allows them to hoard and insulate vital resources.” Id. 
 298 Leon-Moreta, supra note 289, at 3163. 
 299 Id. 
 300 BURNS, supra note 51, at 81. 
 301 Id. 
 302 Id. 
 303 Id. 
 304 Id.; see Tyson, supra note 18, at 669 (“[N]otions of the benefit and value to be derived from the 
formation of municipalities involve assessments about the race and class identity of the residents within 
those boundaries and the potential impact their presence within the municipal community might have on 
real or perceived property values.”). 
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students.305 This reality is unacceptable, and certainly a far cry from what the 
Supreme Court justices proclaimed in Brown v. Board of Education almost 
seventy years ago.306 
B. Why Incorporation Regime Reform Is a Promising Solution 
When incorporation statutes permit any community to incorporate, the 
consequences described in the previous Sections become inevitable.307 States 
have tried to remedy the income heterogeneity that municipal proliferation 
causes, to varying degrees of success.308 
When exclusionary incorporation aggravates property tax base disparities 
among municipalities and county governments, states and counties have to find 
ways to compensate for unequal tax revenues.309 One way in which states have 
addressed regional inequality is through tax base sharing.310 The Minnesota 
State Legislature passed the Minnesota Fiscal Disparities Act in 1971 to create 
a regional tax base sharing initiative between Minneapolis and St. Paul.311 The 
experiment has proven to be successful.312 States also can create regional gov-
                                                                                                                           
 305 See Christina A. Samuels, Voters Approve First Step in Carving Out New School District in 
Louisiana, EDUCATIONWEEK (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.edweek.org/education/voters-approve-first-
step-in-carving-out-new-school-district-in-louisiana/2019/10 [https://perma.cc/69Y4-Z4H9] (explaining 
that St. George’s incorporation would increase the percentage of students of color in the East Baton 
Rouge school system from 73% to 77% and would decrease the percentage of white students from 
12% to 8%). 
 306 See 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (outlawing de jure segregation in schools, and stating that 
“[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal”); supra note 4 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining the holding and consequences of the Court’s decision in Brown). 
 307 See supra notes 288–306 and accompanying text. 
 308 See infra notes 309–317 and accompanying text. 
 309 See Briffault, supra note 28, at 3 (“The delegation of fiscal responsibility for schools . . . to 
local governments serves to heighten the significance of interlocal wealth differences and to perpetu-
ate inequalities in education, housing and employment opportunities.”). 
 310 Katz & Kneebone, supra note 295. In a tax base sharing system, each community contributes 
part of its tax base to a single regional pool. Myron Orfield & Nicholas Wallace, The Minnesota Fis-
cal Disparities Act of 1971: The Twin Cities’ Struggle and Blueprint for Regional Cooperation, 33 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 591, 602 (2007). The funds in the pool are redistributed “according to set 
criteria other than the original contribution rate.” Id. Depending on the system, the communities can 
agree to redistribute based on “tax capacity, service cost or need indicators, land-use decisions, or 
other criteria.” Id. 
 311 MINN. STAT. § 473F.01 (2020); Katz & Kneebone, supra note 295. 
 312 See Orfield & Wallace, supra note 310, at 603 (discussing the benefits of the Minnesota Fiscal 
Disparities Act, citing a decrease in the local tax base disparity by about 20% and a decrease in the 
ratio of 95th-to-5th percentile tax base by nearly 25%). States have other ways of sharing revenue, as 
well. LEAGUE OF ARIZ. CITIES & TOWNS, STATE SHARED REVENUE 1 (2011), https://www.azleague.
org/DocumentCenter/View/26/1112shared_re venue?bidId= [https://perma.cc/C746-VN96]. Arizona, 
for example, uses its Vehicle License Tax, Highway User Revenue, State Sales Tax, Transaction Privilege 
Tax, Urban Revenue Sharing Fund, and State Income Tax to distribute revenue. ARIZ. SENATE RSCH. 
STAFF, ARIZONA STATE SENATE ISSUE BRIEF: STATE SHARED REVENUES 1–2 (2018), https://www.
azleg.gov/Briefs/Senate/STATE%20SHARED%20REVENUES%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/QB9X-
UU6L]; LEAGUE OF ARIZ. CITIES & TOWNS, supra, at 1. The state distributes revenue from the Urban 
2021] Curbing Exclusionary Municipal Incorporation 1755 
ernments to coordinate individual municipalities’ strategic planning.313 Two 
other ways in which states can attempt to equalize revenue is through supple-
menting local public education funding with state funds314 or by increasing 
affordable housing availability.315 To combat interlocal housing disparities, for 
example, New Jersey requires certain municipalities to have a certain number 
of affordable housing units.316 These state measures can only go so far, though, 
because municipalities still have significant zoning and taxing powers.317 
                                                                                                                           
Revenue Sharing Fund to cities, towns, and counties “based on the proportion of the city or town’s 
population compared with the total incorporated population of the state based on the last decennial or 
special census.” ARIZ. SENATE RSCH. STAFF, supra, at 1 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-206 
(2020)). 
 313 Briffault, supra note 51, at 1122. The regional government must have independent legal au-
thority, granted through state legislation and voter approval, to enforce municipal cooperation. Id. at 
1122, 1168. 
 314 School Finance and District Support: FY19 Chapter 70 Aid and Required Contribution Calcu-
lations, MASS. DEP’T OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC. (Jan. 24, 2018), http://www.doe.mass.
edu/finance/chapter70/fy2019/whitepaper.html [https://perma.cc/KFW4-WA3D]. Through its Chapter 
70 Foundation program, Massachusetts identifies the adequate spending level for each district and how 
much could be funded from local property taxes. Id. The amount that the state expects the city to con-
tribute for per-pupil spending is called the “target local contribution.” Id. The state then contributes an 
amount to make up the difference between the two amounts. Id. The state changes the total budget every 
“year to reflect changes in the district’s enrollment; changes in student demographics . . . inflation, 
and geographical differences in wage levels.” Id. In 2019, the state determined that cities and towns 
would contribute 59% of the foundation budget, with the state supplementing 41%. Id. 
 315 FRUG ET AL., supra note 288, at 454–55. 
 316 Id. The New Jersey state judiciary first waded into this area, establishing its affordable hous-
ing requirements in response to Mt. Laurel’s exclusionary zoning measures. Id. at 454 (first citing S. 
Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mt. Laurel (Mt. Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983), rev’d sub nom. 
Urb. League of Greater New Brunswick v. Carteret, 559 A.2d 1369 (N.J. 1989); then citing S. Bur-
lington Cnty. NAACP v. Mt. Laurel (Mt. Laurel I), 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975), rev’d, Mt. Laurel, 456 
A.2d 390, rev’d sub nom. Urb. League, 559 A.2d 1369). Mt. Laurel’s population had grown from a 
population of 2,817 in 1950, to 5,249 in 1960, and later to 11,221 in 1970 because of industry devel-
opment and highway improvement in the region. Mt. Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 718. Mt. Laurel adopted a 
zoning ordinance in 1964 to restrict land use, for the most part, to solely industry and single-family 
housing. Id. at 718–19. The ordinance prohibited more affordable housing, such as attached town-
houses, apartments not located on farms, and mobile homes. Id. at 719. Housing in Mt. Laurel was 
only “within the financial reach of persons of at least middle income.” Id. In South Burlington County 
NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that developing municipalities in New 
Jersey must zone to “make realistically possible an appropriate variety and choice of housing.” Id. at 
724. Eventually, the New Jersey State Legislature stepped in, adopting the Fair Housing Act of 1985. 
FRUG ET AL., supra note 288, at 455 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301–52:27D-329 (West 
2020)). The Fair Housing Act created the Council on Affordable Housing to approve local affordable 
housing plans. Id. The Act also gave localities the option “to sell their fair share obligation to other 
localities through regional contribution agreements.” Id. A municipality could pay another municipali-
ty to take on up to 50% of its own fair share obligation, as long as one of the municipalities built af-
fordable housing with “convenient access to employment opportunities.” Id. (quoting Hills Dev. Co. 
v. Bernards (Mt. Laurel III), 510 A.2d 621 (N.J. 1986)). The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the 
Act’s constitutionality. Id. 
 317 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). In Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that a zoning ordinance is only unconstitutional if it is “clearly arbitrary and 
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.” 
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Rather than relying on these state mechanisms to equalize municipal rev-
enue-generating capabilities, it is imperative that states improve their munici-
pal incorporation laws to prevent further damage.318 The Arizona State Legis-
lature recognized that the proliferation of municipal incorporations, particular-
ly surrounding urban areas, would harm its urban areas.319 The legislature saw 
that incorporation often aggravated income inequality, siphoning away tax rev-
enue from the county government for the exclusive benefit of the new munici-
pality.320 Incorporations adjacent to existing cities also can prevent the cities 
from annexing those same areas to recollect residents who have moved outside 
the city.321 When they cannot capture additional taxpayers, they cannot in-
crease their tax base to provide services to residents of fewer means.322 For the 
aforementioned reasons, the Arizona Legislature decided to build in the city 
consent requirement for incorporation in urbanized areas.323 And this has 
worked.324 
Other states with unincorporated territory should follow Arizona’s lead to 
protect their residents from the harmful consequences of unruly incorporation. 
Because states have the constitutional freedom to structure their municipal in-
corporation regimes however they want, they can—and should—permit all 
impacted communities to vote on incorporation matters, as opposed to solely 
                                                                                                                           
Id. In Belle Terre v. Boraas, the Court upheld a local ordinance restricting land use to one-family 
homes, with family meaning “one or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and 
cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants.” 416 U.S. 1, 2 
(1974). The Supreme Court interpreted the municipality’s police power broadly, not confining it “to 
elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places.” Id. at 9. Instead, the Court affirmed the municipali-
ty’s ability to “lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion 
and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.” Id. 
 318 See George D. Vaubel, Toward Principles of State Restraint upon the Exercise of Municipal 
Power in Home Rule, 20 STETSON L. REV. 5, 16 (1990) (“Limiting incorporation . . . furthers a state 
policy of reducing the proliferation of local units of government.”); see also Wilson, supra note 17, at 
210 (arguing for a new conceptualization of localism, within the context of “suburban municipal se-
cessions from county-based school districts,” that recognizes the county-wide effects). When a munic-
ipality incorporates and secedes from a school district, the benefits that the new municipality experi-
ences are not felt by “the relevant larger community.” Wilson, supra note 17, at 208. 
 319 See Green v. City of Tucson, 340 F.3d 891, 903 (9th Cir. 2003) (“As the district court correct-
ly noted, ‘Arizona has a legitimate state interest not only in regulating the formation of new munici-
palities, but also in protecting the interests of already existing municipalities.’”). 
 320 See Briffault, supra note 28, at 76–77 (explaining that incorporation may “aggravate” wealth 
disparities among localities “or [may] interfere with regional approaches to economic and social prob-
lems”). 
 321 Id. at 77. 
 322 Id. 
 323 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-101.01 (2020); Green, 340 F.3d at 903. 
 324 See supra notes 236–281 and accompanying text (describing Arizona’s municipal incorpora-
tion regime). 
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residents of the proposed municipality.325 Moreover, each state should empow-
er either a state or county entity to review incorporation petitions critically be-
fore they go into effect.326 Particularly in urban areas, states should look to the 
Arizona model to encourage regional growth and minimize interlocal income 
and racial demographic disparities.327 Ideally, states should combine elements 
of the California and Arizona models, empowering a state or county entity to 
review petitions to ensure that they meet certain criteria before holding an 
election wherein both residents of the proposed municipality and residents of 
impacted communities may vote.328 That way, the state would be able to ensure 
that: (1) the neighboring communities have a voice in the process, and (2) the 
incorporation petition fulfills the state’s criteria.329 
It is in every state’s best interest to regulate incorporation effectively in 
order to reduce inequality, promote even growth, and minimize the need for 
state equalizing mechanisms.330 States have significant latitude under the U.S. 
Constitution to enact incorporation laws that reflect their values.331 By reform-
ing their incorporation laws to incorporate urban residents’ voices, states can 
make sure that St. George is the last majority-white breakaway without urban 
consent.332 
                                                                                                                           
 325 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-101.01 (requiring neighboring municipality consent for incor-
poration); Wilson, supra note 17, at 206 (arguing that the entire community, not just the detaching 
residents, must give consent before a community can secede). 
 326 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 56668 (2020) (outlining the factors that a LAFCO must consider 
before approving or denying an incorporation petition). 
 327 Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-101.01 (requiring that proposed municipalities in urban-
ized areas receive consent from the cities or towns that make the area urbanized, prior to incorpora-
tion), with LA. STAT. ANN. § 33:3 (2020) (forbidding adjacent municipalities and surrounding county 
residents from voting in incorporation elections). People living on the outskirts of a city have already 
made the decision to live in an urban area. Laurie Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Pow-
ers, 24 URB. LAW. 247, 266 (1992). They should not be able “to opt out of the responsibilities of ur-
ban life.” Id. After all, their neighbors within the city boundaries have to pay city taxes, regardless of 
whether they personally use the city services that their tax dollars are funding. Id. 
 328 See supra notes 202–282 and accompanying text (highlighting the benefits of the California 
and Arizona incorporation regimes). 
 329 See supra notes 202–282 and accompanying text. 
 330 See Green v. City of Tucson, 340 F.3d 891, 903 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that Arizona had 
a strong interest in both regulating the incorporation of new municipalities and protecting existing 
municipalities); supra notes 288–317 and accompanying text (explaining why state incorporation laws 
that permit exclusionary incorporations are problematic and create a need for greater state equalizing 
mechanisms). 
 331 Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907) (recognizing states’ authority to decide 
their own parameters and processes for municipal boundary change). 
 332 See LA. STAT. ANN. § 33:1–3 (permitting incorporation based on a petition sign by only resi-
dents of the proposed municipality and a vote among the same); Harris, supra note 6 (quoting East 
Baton Rouge Parish school board member Dadrius Lanus, a graduate of the school district, who said 
that the recent incorporation votes in St. George, Zachary, and Central were “because of white flight,” 
and “for a city the size of Baton Rouge, it has been devastating”). 
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CONCLUSION 
Municipal incorporations impact not only the residents of the new munic-
ipality, but also all individuals who reside around the new municipality. The 
Supreme Court gifted states with the opportunity to structure their incorpora-
tion regimes however they see fit, so long as they do not violate constitutional-
ly protected rights. States should seize that opportunity by implementing 
mechanisms to permit only beneficial incorporations, such as: (1) empowering 
state entities to review proposals through the lens of regional impact; and (2) 
granting neighboring municipalities the right to vote on nearby incorporations 
that will affect them. These mechanisms would promote regional growth and 
reduce interlocal income disparity and racial segregation. 
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